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To my mother, whose wisdom is my compass. 
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Summary 
This thesis orbits around the changes in the Swedish abortion laws during the last century, and 
the relation to religion. The aim is to make visible the values enshrined in the first abortion 
law, and those in the current abortion law, as the legislation made a volte-face in the 1970’s. 
Today, abortion is a right and the state is the duty-bearer. This construction collides with the 
conscience of religious health care personnel. By the examination of two events and the 
debates in relation to them, the changes and the collisions are highlighted. In addition, the 
material is examined by the help of the theory critical positivism. Critical positivism divides 
the law into three levels. This division makes visible how the law serves to produce and 
reproduce itself – and the values therein. Then, exactly what has changed? What values can 
we see in the laws and what has been put forward in each respective debate? As the issues 
pertain to human rights, what does the ECHR framework set forth?  
 
In 1965, Swedish women travelled to Poland to obtain abortion. At the time, the Swedish 
penal law had ceased to be applied, but remained in force. Nevertheless, the Prosecutor 
General wanted to prosecute the persons involved, for the purpose of preserving Swedish 
morals; a purpose that cause indignation in the debate. Subsequently, abolition was employed. 
In the affair’s immediate aftermath, the investigation that lead to the new abortion law was 
commissioned. At the time of writing, a midwife has lost her case before the Labour Court, 
where she claimed her right to conscientious objection to abortion. To uphold a criterion for 
employment that requires every employee to participate in all parts of work, even though a 
part of the work is not compatible with the conscience of the one seeking the position, does 
not amount to discrimination.  
 
By also studying the preparatory works to both the abortion legislation and the provision on 
freedom of religion, the breaking of ties between abortion and religion, and the state and 
religious morals, is made even more visible. It is also revealed that the constitutional 
protection of religious exercise is not as strong as it seems – freedom of religion cannot 
impede social reforms or interfere with the principle of majority. As a result of the 
comparison and the analysis, the thesis highlights the development and finds that the value 
promoted today, access to abortion, is upheld by the Labour Court’s judgment in relation to 
conscientious objection, and in a Swedish context, also by the ECtHR. 
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Sammanfattning 
Studien i fråga ämnar lyfta fram de förändringar som svensk abortlagstiftning har genomgått, 
från den första abortlagstiftningen till den nuvarande regleringen – samt de värderingar som 
finns däri.  Eftersom lagstiftningen har stått i nära förbund med religiös moral, ingår skyddet 
för religionsfrihet i studien. Abort är i dag en rättighet och det åligger staten att förverkliga 
rättigheten – konstruktionen har lett till problem för hälso- och sjukvårdspersonal med 
religiösa värderingar. Genom att dels studera den relevanta lagstiftningen, dels undersöka två 
stycken för abortdebatten betydande händelser – en på 1960-talet och en som sker i skrivande 
stund,  och de därtill förekommande diskussionerna – förs de förändringar som har skett på 
området fram än tydligare. Kaarlo Tuoris teori critical positivism, som genom sin tredelade 
struktur visar på hur lagstiftning står i ständig färd med att bekräfta sig själv, har anammats i 
analysen. Vilka förändringar har skett? Vilka värderingar har givits företräde i lagstiftningen? 
Hur har debatten kring abort och samvetsfrihet – som Ellinor Grimmark, barnmorskan vars 
fall studeras, åberopar – sett ut?  Hur förhåller sig rätten och värderingarna till EKMR? 
 
År 1965 stod det svenska åklagarväsendet i färd med att åtala ett antal svenska kvinnor och 
deras medhjälpare för att kvinnorna i fråga hade erhållit abort i Polen. Vid denna tidpunkt 
hade strafflagstiftningen för avbrytande av havandeskap upphört att tillämpas. Emellertid 
rekommenderade riksåklagaren åtal i syfte att upprätthålla svensk moral, en tolkning som 
kritiserades och sedermera mynnade ut i att abolition tillämpades. Några dagar efter beslutet 
om abolition tillsattes den utredning som kom att utgöra grunden för den nya 
abortlagstiftningen, som än i dag är i kraft. I skrivande stund har Ellinor Grimmark förlorat 
sin talan rörande samvetsfrihet i Arbetsdomstolen; sjukhusen som nekade henne anställning 
har inte diskriminerat henne när de krävde att hon skulle utföra samtliga uppgifter som åligger 
en barnmorska. Trots att hennes oförmåga att utföra bland annat abort grundar sig i en religiös 
övertygelse får ett kriterium av detta slag upprätthållas om verksamheten så kräver. 
Undersökningen av händelserna och den relevanta lagstiftningen tydliggör separationen 
mellan abort – religion och stat – religiös moral. Det visas i sammanhanget att det 
konstitutionella skyddet för religionsfrihet inte är så starkt som en första läsning av 
bestämmelserna antyder. Religionsfriheten får inte utgöra hinder för demokratisk utveckling. 
Avslutningsvis lyfter analysen fram utvecklingen, ur vilken framgår att rätten till abort 
bekräftas av Arbetsdomstolens avgörande och i förlängningen, av EKMR. 
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Preface 
These last five-six years have been quite a journey – not one to Poland, I only got to Italy. As 
I sit here, late May 2017, I would like to thank my supervisor Elsa Trolle Önnerfors, whose 
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There are a number of reasons I asked you to supervise both my master thesis and my 
bachelor thesis, all anchored in your talent and wit. I would also like to thank – as I proceed to 
the end of my time as a law student – Karol Nowak and Eva Ryrstedt, whose presence at the 
Faculty of Law in Lund inspired me to become the law student I wanted to be. I would like to 
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spring!) and Jeanette (we did it!). To my mother – my indebtedness to you will never cease to 
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genuine interest in my thesis. However, most of all, for your tireless patience, encouragement, 
and love – spasibo. 
 
At last I would like to send a letter to the younger version of me – a letter to her who arrived 
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We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring  
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And know the place for the first time 
 
 
 
 
Lund, 23rd May 2017 
 
(And oh, the quite Cartesian title is nothing but a coincidence.) 
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Abbreviations and Glossarium 
 
1938 Abortion Act Lag (1938:318) om avbrytande av havandeskap 
 
1975 Abortion Act Abortlag (1974:595) 
 
ADF Alliance Defending Freedom 
 
Church of Sweden  Svenska kyrkan 
 
DO The Equality Ombudsman 
 
ECHR Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Rome, 4.XI.1950 
 
ECtHR  The European Court of Human Rights 
 
EU   The European Union 
 
Instrument of Kungörelse (1974:152) 
Government   om beslutad ny regeringsform, part of the Swedish Constitution 
 
JO  Parliamentary Ombudsmen (Justitiesombudsmännen in Swedish) 
 
Penal Code  Brottsbalk (1962:700) 
 
PACE   The Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe  
 
Swedish Constitution Sveriges grundlag 
 
UDHR  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as proclaimed by the 
General Assembly on the 10th of December 1948, United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 217 A 
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UN  The United Nations 
 
UN Charter The Charter of the United Nations, signed 26th June 1945, date of 
entry into force 24th October 19451 
 
Abortion is employed in order to describe all methods of termination of pregnancy, no matter 
how far the pregnancy has proceeded. Noteworthy, throughout history, and still today, 
legislation contains different definitions of termination of pregnancy as to mark when during 
pregnancy an interruption was made, in order to stipulate different legal consequences.2 
 
Kungl. Maj:t is, in Swedish, an older form for His Majesty the King. The form was used 
before the strictly formal and representative – when the functional relationship remained - role 
of the King in the Swedish Government was dissolved. Ergo, Kungl. Maj:t equals the 
Swedish Government. The notion disappeared when the new Instrument of Government 
entered into force in 1975. 
 
SOU is short for statens offentliga utredningar, meaning ‘Swedish Government Official 
Reports’. Such a report contains consultation comments – opinions from different institutions 
of society as well as, exempli gratia historical accounts on the subject of the report.  
 
The Prosecutor General is in Sweden the prosecutor who holds the highest position within the 
Swedish public prosecution service. The Prosecutor General is responsible for the main 
international issues.3 
 
The Riksdag is employed when referring to riksdagen, the Swedish Parliament. 
 
                                                
1 See United Nations, Charter of the United Nations. Available at: http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/, 
(accessed 25th March 2017). 
2 See the 1975 Abortion Act, Article 5 where the distinction between abortion and termination of pregnancy is 
stipulated – Article 6 of the same act provides that termination of pregnancy are procedures performed post the 
18th week of pregnancy; abortions are those before. 
3 Åklagarmyndigheten, Om oss: Riksåklagaren. Available at: https://www.aklagare.se/om-oss/riksaklagaren/ 
(accessed 25th March 2017).  
 6 
The Medical Board in Swedish: Medicinalstyrelsen, the former board allotted responsibility 
for healthcare and related social functions, replaced by the National Board of Health and 
Welfare. 
 
The National Board for Health and Welfare named Socialstyrelsen in Swedish, the authority 
responsible for health care issues, welfare and access to good care. 
 7 
1 Introduction  
1.1 Background and Introductory Words 
During the 20th century, the structure of Sweden underwent crucial reforms which yielded a 
democratic welfare-system. As archaic conceptions were put under the microscope, universal 
suffrage was introduced, the welfare-system was constructed and sexual norms were 
challenged. The last century was a century of important changes in the fundaments of society. 
There among, abortion and the diminishing morals were subject to vivid debate. Not all 
agreed on the criminalisation of abortion, not all agreed on the new moral order they claimed 
to observe. The dissenters as to the prohibition on abortion had been active for a while. For 
example, the Swedish midwife Carolina Redlund was sentenced for practising abortions in the 
late 19th century.4 Little did a midwife know of the changes to come. The thorough 
liberalisation of the abortion legislation in Sweden took place in the 1970’s. However, 
judging from the headlines of today, we are not done with the question. Few matters repeated 
cause controversy like the subject of abortion. Everyone, as a democracy solemnly swears, 
has a say in the matter. In late March 2017, SVT5 reported that, when the search term abortion 
is used, Google Croatia presents, as a second hit, a link to the homepage of an ‘Abortion 
Clinic’ offering consulting. Once at the appointment, it is revealed that the ‘clinic’ is an 
organisation with the intention of convincing women not to have an abortion.6 In early 2017, 
there were headlines with a photo picturing the 45th President of the United States, sitting in 
the Oval Office, in the process of signing an order on a strict abortion policy, surrounded by a 
group of men.7 The scenario resembles the history of Sweden’s abortion legislation; this is 
why the thesis gazes back to 1965 in Sweden and the debates that followed the revealed 
abortion trips to Poland by Swedish women. The Prosecutor General recommended that the 
people involved could be prosecuted in Sweden, which caused nothing less than an 
earthquake in the debate; all ended as the rare and seldom employed institute abolition – a 
form of waiver of prosecution – was used. In the wake of the debacle, a commission was 
                                                
4 Sveriges Radio P1, Släktband: De bröt medvetet mot lagen för att hjälpa. Aired and published 12th December 
2016. Available at: http://sverigesradio.se/sida/avsnitt/821291?programid=2068, (accessed 30th March 2017). 
5 SVT is short for Sveriges Television, a Swedish national TV-channel. 
6 SVT, Pappor ångrar sig när de ser bebisen. Published 28th March 2017. Available at: 
https://www.svt.se/nyheter/pappor-angrar-sig-nar-de-ser-bebisen, (accessed 24th April 2017). 
7 See, amongst many sources, BBC, “Trump’s order on abortion policy: What does it mean?” Published 24th 
January 2017. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38729364, (accessed 30th January 2017). 
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formed, with a mandate to investigate the abortion legislation.8 Then there is the 
contemporary example of the Swedish midwife, Ellinor Grimmark, who argues for her 
freedom of conscience, to have the right to not perform abortion and related medical 
treatment. In tandem, an anti-abortion movement spreads over Europe and existing ‘liberal’ 
abortion laws are challenged – laws made in the recent past. The medial earthquake Ellinor 
Grimmark’s case resulted in resembles the one the Poland abortions caused. Importantly, both 
events and debates concern individual opposition against the ethical principle enshrined in 
law. Therefore, the two debates highlight issues as to an individual in opposition to the idea 
reflected by the law in force. As we find ourselves in an international legal context where the 
ECHR holds a parent position in the norm hierarchy, the questions’ relation to and the 
influence of ECHR must be examined. Learning from the 1960’s, we find that the countries of 
the Council of Europe can drastically change their legislation. Poland’s abortion law is a 
textbook example of a law subject to a turnabout. Noteworthy, Poland ratified the ECHR in 
1993 whilst Sweden did so in 1952. Swedish citizens travelled to Poland in the 1960’s to 
access abortions, when Poland was not a member of the Council of Europe, but had more 
liberal abortion laws in force than today.9 Nowadays, both countries are members of the 
Council of Europe, yet have abortion laws which express the will to protect fundamentally 
different values. In tandem, the Polish Abortion Act is subject to heated debate, where 
attempts have been made to further restrict the already restrictive access to abortion. What 
does this tell us about the structure of law, society, and the structure of changes? How is 
people’s sense of justice reflected in the changes of the law?  
 
The first event is referred to as the Poland case or the Poland affair, the second by the name 
of the objecting midwife: the case of Ellinor Grimmark. The first event occurred in the 
1960’s, the second is taking place whilst this thesis is written. Both events belong to a 
contentious sphere and are characterised by intense debates: the first preceded what can be 
described as the liberal cleanse of the Swedish abortion legislation, the second happens in a 
time where the set values of the abortion law are suddenly questioned, yet again. In the wake 
of the Poland case, the long traditional view lost its dominance. Completely abandoned, a 
more liberal view was favoured with a focus of the individual wherein social conditions and 
free choice became salient. Today, Ellinor Grimmark argues her freedom of conscience – her 
                                                
8 SOU 1971:58, p. 3. 
9 See Council of Europe, Treaty Office: Chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 005. Available at: 
http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/005/signatures, (accessed 17th April 2017). 
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belief in the sacrosanctity of life from the moment of conception – in objecting to perform 
inter alia abortion. Her perception is in line with the state position questioned and abandoned 
circa 50 years ago. The two events meet and blend as they touch upon the same issue and call 
into question the intricate notion of the state as neutral in morally sensitive – eternal – issues. 
Adjacent to religion and individual freedom, the events raise questions on how the 
individual’s conscience and privacy is to be positioned in a democratic society and what the 
focus and interests of a state are in relation to abortion laws. As Peter Stockmann in Henrik 
Ibsen’s An Enemy of the People says: 
Dr. Stockmann: But what about public opinion, then? Surely you would not dare to do it on 
account of public feeling...  
Peter Stockmann: Public opinion is an extremely mutable thing.10 
 
1.2 Objective 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine, understand, and analyse values and changes in the 
interest that Sweden gives precedence to in the abortion legislation, by examining two 
distinguished events related to abortion and conscientious objection to abortion. 
Subsequently, to unfold and trace the arguments of the debates. A subsidiary aim is to ponder 
possible similarities of the two debates and reflect on the issues in relation to the ECHR, as 
the ECtHR holds a strong position in relation to the signatory states. The topic is of current 
interest and furthermore, it brings into light important aspects of how different starting points 
in the interpretation of rights and freedoms affect the perception of what human rights are and 
how a collision of interest is to be solved. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
The central theme of this thesis is how the relationship between the individual and the state 
has been shaped and developed in the specific context of abortion, covering a span from the 
beginning of the cardinal change of the Swedish abortion legislation in 1975 to the present 
times where the abortion legislation seems to be put under the microscope yet again, in 
                                                
10 Ibsen, An Enemy of the People, EBook.  
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connection to the debate of conscientious objection. The question is explored by examining 
two cases: The Poland case, from 1965 and the current case of Ellinor Grimmark. Both 
concern individuals in opposition to the current legislation. First, in order to grasp the debates, 
it is necessary to lay down the relevant legal framework. This process will answer the 
question: What values are enshrined within the relevant laws? The answer constitutes the 
basis for the thesis as a whole. 
 
Second, having addressed the question of what values lead to and are protected by the 
relevant legal framework, the next step is to look at what arguments dominated the respective 
debates in order to find out if any similarities can be discerned?  
 
The third and overarching research question draws on the findings from the other questions. 
By employing Kaarlo Tuori’s theory on law, the question to be answered is: What changes 
can be observed, how are the changes reflected in the patterns of law and societal values – 
what the interest of society is framed as – as to abortion in the relevant period of time?  
 
In all this, the international context is inevitable. The period of time explored is intimately 
linked with the development of human rights. Ellinor Grimmark intends to bring her matter 
before the ECtHR, she now works in Norway and importantly, the Poland case evolves 
around an event where Swedish citizens travelled to Poland, a country with a liberal abortion 
law. Today, Sweden has proclaimed itself as a leading country in the area of reproductive 
health.11 Hence, this descends intimately from the core issue and touches upon the human 
rights perspective: as Sweden is a signatory state to the system emanating from the Council of 
Europe, relevant regulations in the ECHR are examined and Sweden’s relationship to the 
ECtHR in the context. Thus, the question as to how the Swedish regulation is affected by the 
ECHR is subject to interest from a perspective of state-specific morals.  
 
1.4 Method 
The research questions chosen border on a variety of aspects of law, moral, and society. 
Therefore, the method is chosen to function for all angles of the thesis and adequately answer 
the questions posed. The legal dogmatic method is employed and supplemented by the 
                                                
11 SOU 2005:90, p. 25. 
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method of sociology of law. First, to examine and answer the research questions, the legal 
dogmatic method is used as to bring about a proper understanding of the legal framework that 
governs abortion and freedom of religion and conscience, in Sweden and under the ECHR. 
Further, the Swedish legislation is in focus, and therefore the traditional Swedish legal 
dogmatic method is used. The doctrine of the hierarchy of legal sources constitutes the basis 
of the Swedish legal system. The doctrine confers to each source of law a certain value, a 
given place in the hierarchy of norms, as follows: 1) the Constitution, 2) legislation,12  
3) legislative preparatory works, 4) case law, 5) general principles of law, 6) custom and 
usage, and 7) legal scholarship. The accession to ECHR and other international instruments 
influences the hierarchical order. For the purposes of the thesis, it is worth to know that the 
legislative preparatory works have a high dignity in the interpretation of what the law is.13  
 
In order to define de lege lata and understand the law, the traditional legal dogmatic method is 
employed. Hereto, understanding the history of the given law is crucial as the composition 
behind and history of the norm may still affect the legislation of today. Obsolote ideas 
sometimes linger within the law.14 The basis in the traditional legal dogmatic method is to 
work on the norm hierarchy and analyse its components as an end to find what the law is and 
how to interpret and implement the said law in a given situation.15 In sum, the method used is 
helpful in the search of a possible legal solution by the application of an identified law.16 In 
addition, the method proves itself useful as the method’s inherent approach illuminates and 
maps the considerations and issues at stake that served to form the law. Human rights law is a 
branch of international law. International law differs from domestic law when it comes to 
sources. Thereby, the classic legal dogmatic method is employed mutatis mutandis. However, 
as the ECHR is the instrument in focus, the method functions in relation to the ECHR and the 
interpretation of the rights as carried out by the Strasbourg organs. Hence, the ECtHR’s flora 
of jurisprudence constitutes the main source of law, in addition to the ECHR itself. 
 
The sociology of law method complements the legal dogmatic method. Closely connected to 
the theory explained infra, the method constitutes the basis for analysing the relationship 
between law and society; the approach enlightens how society affects law making and its 
                                                
12 Under this sorts a) Parliamentary acts, b) governmental regulations and c) agency regulations.  
13 Carlson, 2012, p. 41–47.  
14 Kleineman, 2013, p. 23.  
15 Kleineman, 2013, p. 21, 26. 
16 Kleineman, 2013, p. 29. 
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interpretation. The method helps in the search to highlight how the opinion influenced and 
influence law – to know and understand the context in which the law exists and how it shapes 
the law. The thought which powers the method is that the function of a norm in society, and 
thereto related questions, must be examined in order to truly understand a given legal norm 
from a societal perspective. Hence, it focuses on the role of law in society. In the Nordic 
countries, the methodology grew popular in tandem with the welfare state.17 As the early 
abortion act intimately links to the women’s rights movement and indeed, goes hand in hand 
with the said emerging welfare state, the method is of particular relevance.   
 
1.5 Theory 
The theory is chosen to adequately grasp and present the object of the thesis. The theory 
critical positivism coined by Kaarlo Tuori – professor emeritus at University of Helsiniki – is 
used to highlight the most pertinent elements of the two debates and as a tool to understand 
the changes the examined period is tinged with. Appearing mainly in the analysis, the theory 
is useful as a means to grasp, structure, and understand the results of the debates as well as the 
role of de lege lata. Further, the theory is found to be helpful in order to illuminate differences 
and similarities between the debates and the legal aspects encompassed.  
 
In brief, critical positivism is defined as the idea that law can be considered and analysed from 
the understanding that it consists of multiple layers.18 Tuori sketches his scheme against a 
background of understanding natural law and human law, where the former is derived from 
something abstract – human, subjective nature, the objective will of God or the eternal 
objective order of the universe – whilst the latter roots in human actions. Human law is 
divided in two main subdivisions: positive law and traditional law; the former origins in 
decisions from authorities et similar; the latter appears in patterns of human social life. 
Traditionally, natural law governed the limits of law. In context, the close relationship 
between human rights and natural law must be pointed to. As Tuori stresses, the subjective 
human nature or an objective order is no longer viable as an instrument to justify and set the 
limits of law. Thus, as the contemporary law builds on positive law and has rejected the 
abstract order earlier accepted, what doctrine sets demarcations of law in modern times – 
                                                
17 Hydén, 2013, p. 207–209.  
18 Tuori, 1997, p. 429. 
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limits needed as the regulations of the welfare states are vast and increasing?19  
 
In sum, legal positivism – the theory on modern law – is characterised by three main 
principles: the separation of the two spheres Is and Ought, the isolation of law from other 
social norms, therein morals, and the view of law as a product of practical human action.20 It 
is worth noting that the theory of Tuori evolves around the question of law’s validity and 
processes through which law is made, production and reproduction. Validity as such is of 
little, yet some, interest for the purposes of this thesis, and his theory is mainly employed as a 
tool to shed light upon the changes and discern patterns of arguments. Tuori’s scheme 
consists of three layers: 
 
The surface level of law (top-level) 
 
The legal culture (middle-level) 
 
The deep structure of law (deep-level) 
 
 
In a view from above – the surface level – the two lower levels are sedimentations of the 
changes, changes which are reflected in the legislation enacted and applied. The levels can 
differ as society changes. Within the surface level of law falls all forms of legal regulations, 
such as laws enacted and court decisions – it consists of the outcome of a constant discussion 
between the legislator, the judges, and the legal scholars. In the layer thereunder, the legal 
culture layer, the expert culture of legal professionals’ crowd is sorted, as well as the general 
legal culture of ordinary citizens. Hereunder sorts doctrine and general principles that serve to 
systematise the legal system – legal science. The most stable and difficult notions to change 
and challenge are identified in the deep structure of the law. Here rest the matters which bear 
                                                
19 Tuori, 1997, p. 427–428. Further, Tuori posed his theory on critical positivism as an alternative to theories 
posed by two of the most influential legal positivists, Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart; an alternative to Kelsen’s 
idea of the Grundnorm, which in brief can be described as the basic and necessary, non-positivist, norm that 
explains the unity of all legal systems; as Kelsen postulates a system where eaxh norm finds validity in other 
norms, the Grundnorm serves the ultimate validity basis. Hart however found validity in the rule of recognition – 
a social fact – which in brief consists of the application of the law by judges and others, thereby conferring 
validity to the norms. As the question of validity of the laws and limits thereto is not the object of this thesis, this 
part has been left to the footnote as it caters a deeer understanding of Tuori’s theory, Tuori, 1997, p. 429. See 
also, Raz, Joseph, Kelsen’s Theory of the Basic Norm, p. 94–111, In: The American Journal of Jurisprudence, 
Vol. 19, Iss. 1, Article 6, June 1974, p. 94–95.  
20 Tuori, 1997, p. 429–430.  
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and govern what types of laws that mark an era: Tuori holds that what we find at the deepest 
level, divides law into and marks époques. The base level comprises categories of general 
legal subjectivity and subjective right – it forms what rationality is, and tends to limit and 
shape what is acceptable during a given era. Thus, insight at the deep level enables 
understanding of what type of law dominated a certain era and differences manifested at the 
surface level. The notions work both constitutively and restrictively. The categories at the 
sediment influence what is accepted; it sets the dominating argumentation, forms the 
normative prerequisites and thereby the changes on the surface level.21 Tuori argues that 
every act of legislation takes part “in the production, reproduction, and modification of legal 
culture and the deep structure of law”22 – the structures are interrelated. For example, human 
rights in the positivist era have reached the deeper levels through constitutional amendments, 
international influence, and the works of scholars. Moreover, an interpretation by a judicial 
organ can be done in the light of a principle rooted in certain morals. This relation between 
the levels of law comprises the immanent critical part of the system – the different levels 
exercise critique over one another. Justification of norms and principles are intertwined herein 
where a certain principle, be it morally tinged or not, finds justification at the deep level.23 
 
Görel Granström’s dissertation, mentioned infra, has been important in the framing of a 
theory. Some points made by Granström on the male conscientious objector to military 
service serve as a complement to, or an elucidation of, the theory on critical positivism. 
Granström postulated that, as the sphere of the individual’s possibility is governed and 
narrowed by the relationship between the interests of the individual and the interests of the 
state, the relationship is also one of rights and duties. As the state is responsible for and 
governs Swedish health care, which is the area of abortion and midwives, the relationship is 
similarly circumscribed. Granström aimed to understand the notion of an individual’s 
latitude.24 Hence, Granström’s approach helps to discern the details in the changes in relation 
to the events and legislation discussed in the thesis; the approach serves as a guide in the 
endeavour to point out patterns in the arguments and the interests given precedence. 
Inevitably in context, reflections on the women’s rights movement will be brought up in the 
analysis as the women’s rights movement has played and still plays an important part in the 
realisation of equity. 
                                                
21 Tuori, 1997, p. 432–439.  
22 Tuori, 1997, p. 437. 
23 Tuori, 1997, p. 435–437, 440–442. 
24 Granström, 2002, p. 13–15. 
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1.6 Material and Status of Research 
First, in order to fulfil the purposes, a thorough background study on the law is taken on, 
enabling a robust contextual understanding of the subject. This forms part of the research 
question per se; mapping the legislation and principles governing the field of focus is cardinal 
in an examination of changes and development. Second, to trace and understand the debates, 
official documents such as judgments and decisions, newspaper clippings, writings, and other 
statements akin are vital. Debates in newspapers are therefore paired with abstracts of the 
debate and the event provided for in the SOUs and other public prints. The official material 
offers a stable reflection of the public opinion and highlights tendencies. Both subjects form 
excellent content for sensation journalism. The more vociferous entries have only sometimes 
been included to represent properly the debate. In addition, the inclusion of an argument from 
a newspaper clipping in the thesis does not afford a precise scientific value to the argument. 
The opinions are included for the purpose of understanding the happenings and the debates 
that surround the two events. As for the Poland affairs and its retinues, the materials are 
available at the National Archives; this is true for both newspaper clippings, materials 
included in the preliminary investigation and other public documents and sources. The 
documents which preceded the governmental decision – inter alia the missives from the 
Prosecutor General – and the decision itself constitute the prime material. The newspaper 
clippings serve as a complement to understand the debate.  
 
Turning to Ellinor Grimmark and the freedom of conscience, the judgment of the Labour 
Court delivered 12th April 2017 is the principal document used. Victoria Enkvist at the 
Faculty of Law of Uppsala University has written a dissertation on freedom of religion, “A 
Framework for Religious Freedom under the Swedish Law”. Enkvist examines the issues 
emanating from the lack of coherency between the absolute prohibition on limits of the 
freedom of religion – the black letter of the law provides for an absolute protection – of the 
Swedish constitution and the jurisprudence which reflects the freedom as relative in nature. 
Enkvist’s colleague, Kavot Zillén, has undertaken research in a related field, namely the 
freedom of conscience of healthcare professionals. Zilléns dissertation gravitates around the 
rights of the patient and the employee. Zillén was interviewed on the subject of freedom of 
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conscience in relation to the pleas of Ellinor Grimmark;25 Enkvist and Zillén, in collaboration, 
wrote an article on how the freedom of religion functions.26 The works of Enkvist and Zillén 
have been useful in understanding and mapping the legal framework of the question.  
 
For the sections on ECHR and the interpretation of its rights and freedoms, William A. 
Schabas commentary The European Convention on Human Rights. A Commentary is a solid 
and authentic opus on the rights and freedoms and their respective interpretation.27 William A. 
Schabas holds tenure at a number of universities, inter alia Middlesex University in London 
and University of Leiden. Schabas has written numerous books on international law and 
human rights.28 Nevertheless, the ECtHR’s case-law is the most prominent material in 
understanding what the rights and freedoms are under the ECHR, as the black letter of the law 
is open for a dynamic interpretation.  
 
In addition, Görel Granström’s academic dissertation has served as a solid source of 
inspiration; it has been helpful in the progress of grasping, theorizing, and contextualising the 
abstract ideas that form the basis for the thesis. Görel Granström is a senior lecturer at the 
Department of Law, Umeå University.  
 
Further, Lenita Freidenvall is an associate professor and senior lecturer at the Department of 
Political Science, Stockholm University. Freidenvall conducts research on topics as gender, 
political representation and intersectionality.29 In the chapter “In Pursuit of Bodily Integrity in 
Sweden” in European Women’s Movement and Body Politics, she analysed prostitution, 
abortion, and women’s organisations in Sweden in a similar range of time as this thesis; she 
                                                
25 Sveriges Radio, Barnmorskorna och antiabortlobbyn: Abortvägrande barnmorskor får stöd av amerikansk 
lobby. Aired and published 24th January 2017. Available at: 
http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=83&artikel=6614458, (accessed 10th February 2017). 
26 Zillén, Kavot and Enkvist, Victoria, Abortvägran, religiös klädsel och obligatorisk skolundervisning – så 
fungerar religionsfriheten. Published 21st February 2017. Available at: 
http://www.dagensjuridik.se/2017/02/abortvagran-religios-kladsel-och-obligatorisk-skolundervisning-sa-
fungerar-religionsfriheten, (accessed 22nd February 2017). 
27 The work is listed at the website of the European Court of Human Rights, Library: Collections: Latest 
Commentaries and Manuals on the Convention. Available at: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=library/collections&c=#n14846619462154096107699_pointer 
(accessed 16th April 2017). 
28 Middlesex University London, Prof. William Schabas. Available at: 
https://www.mdx.ac.uk/about-us/our-people/staff-directory/profile/schabas-william (accessed 16th April 2017). 
29 Stockholms universitet, Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Lenita Freidenvall. Available at: 
http://www.statsvet.su.se/forskning/våra-forskare/lenita-freidenvall/lenita-freidenvall-1.119508 (accessed 27th 
April 2017). 
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found that bodily integrity has been strengthened as the issue was framed as one of bodily 
citizenship. Women were given the right to their own bodies.30  
 
Reinhold Fahlbeck is professor emeritus in labour law and senior professor at the Faculty of 
Law, Lund University. His voice has been heard in the debate of freedom of conscience. He 
has inter alia written an article on the subject of freedom of conscience and abortion in 
relation to the ECHR, where he claimed that the ECtHR will find that Sweden has breached 
the ECHR in the case of Ellinor Grimmark.31 However, this thesis does not deal with the 
outcome of a balancing task under the ECtHR per se. Yet the arguments employed by 
Reinhold Fahlbeck are of interest in the debate related to freedom of conscience. 
 
1.7 Delimitations 
Rare are the contentious debates characterised by only objective and pertinent arguments; ‘the 
women’s issue’ and ‘the religious matter’ both attract arguments of all types as well as 
arguments associated with innumerable disciplines. The material aspect of such arguments – 
their potential durability and scientific basis – falls outside the scope of this thesis, yet the 
existence and the use of such thoughts in the debate are included, as debate structures and 
arguing per se form part of the thesis. Exempli gratia, the inherent validity of philosophical, 
religious, and medical arguments on when and how life begins will not be explored. Their 
existence and the simple fact that different strands exist and therefore – to a greater or lesser 
extent – polarize the debate overall is relevant. The precise content of a patient’s right and 
access to medical care is not considered, nor is a labour law perspective examined. The thesis 
takes on the values expressed at the time of the two events chosen, whereby the lawfulness of 
an employee’s objection to abortion is not discussed per se. In her dissertation, Kavot Zillén32 
examines health care personnel’s conscientious objection from a health care and labour 
perspective, whereby her writings are recommended for those interested. The scope of the 
thesis is akin to other territories occupied with the question of the individual’s role or a 
citizen’s part in society, in relation to others and importantly, in relation to the state.  
                                                
30 Freidenvall, Lenita, In Pursuit of Bodily Integrity in Sweden, p. 118–152, In: European Women’s Movement 
and Body Politics: The Struggle for Autonomy, Joyce Outshoorn (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan UK: United 
Kingdom, 2015. 
31 Fahlbeck, Reinhold, Religionsfrihet och mänskliga rättigheter, In: Juridisk Tidsskrift, No. 12014/15, p. 3–27.  
32 See under the presentation of Kavot Zillén.  
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Inter alia euthanasia and conscientious objection to (compulsory) military service are 
questions moving in the same sphere. These areas will be brought up frugally, but remain in 
general outside the scope. The aspect of discrimination – an important Article of the ECHR, 
set forth in Article 14, not operating alone standing but always in conjunction with one of the 
material rights such as Article 9 – will not be dealt with in detail. As mentioned supra, the 
purpose of the thesis is to shed light on values embedded in the laws governing the subject, 
but reflections on whether the measures subject to examination amount to discrimination or 
not is left outside the scope.  
 
Furthermore, the ECHR constitutes the main international legal framework for this thesis. The 
ECtHR takes into account national legislation and international law – it does not operate in a 
legal vacuum.33 Therefore, the ECHR can be considered indicative of the international 
development relevant for Sweden. For example, Sweden is a member of the EU. EU has its 
own bill of rights – the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.34 Article 52.3 
of said Charter states that when the rights of the Charter correspond to those in the ECHR, the 
meaning and scope of the rights in the Charter shall be the same as in ECHR. However, this 
unity in interpretation does not prevent the rights protection by the EU to be more extensive. 
Nevertheless, the ECHR sets the standard, whereby this document is in focus. The topic of 
this thesis is oftentimes described as one of a conflict of rights – the woman’s will and body 
and the health care employee’s will and conscience. As the matter is one of balancing rights, 
the discussion on an extended protection is not paid attention to. Lastly, these matters touch 
upon a wide range of other human rights than the two in focus. Freedom of expression and the 
right to life are sometimes mentioned. The absence of discussion on other human rights 
implications does not render such implications irrelevant. However, those are considered to 
fall outside the scope as the chosen focus illumines the values and opinions subject to 
analysis.  
 
                                                
33 Letsas, Strasbourg’s Interpretive Ethics: Lessons for the International Lawyer, p. 521–523. See also Articles 
31–33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in which means and methods for interpretation 
governing the area of international law are enshrined. 
34 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, (2000/C 364/01). 
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1.8 Disposition and Structure 
The disposition is ordered according to a chronological structure and a division of sections, 
where the first chapter includes introduction, method, theory and related formalities, followed 
by chapter two that describes some useful basic concepts. In the third chapter on abortion 
there is an account of the abortion legislation – both the national law and the ECHR 
protection – the Poland case and the debates on the matter. Consequently, the impact of the 
event is examined by mapping the end of the road to the 1975 Abortion Act. In the fourth 
chapter the thesis takes a turn to freedom of religion and conscience. This is done by 
unfolding the status of freedom of religion and conscience in Sweden and under the ECHR. 
The case of Ellinor Grimmark and the debates on conscientious objection are examined 
thereto. In the fifth chapter comes an analysis of the two debates and the values expressed 
therein, where the theory presented by Kaarlo Tuori is employed in order to highlight the 
structures. In chapter six, a brief conclusion is given.  
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2 Basic Concepts 
In order to facilitate a better understanding of the thesis, this chapter contains brief 
presentations on basic concepts drawn on in the text. 
 
2.1 A Brief Note on Democracy in Sweden 
Parliamentary rule was realised in 1917 and was followed by the introduction of universal 
suffrage in 1921.35 Chapter 1 Articles 1 and 4 of the Instrument of Government states that all 
public power proceeds from the people, where the Riksdag, the foremost representative of the 
people, enacts the laws.36 The seats of the Riksdag are assigned in proportion to the election 
result.37 In brief, the Riksdag appoints the Government. The Swedish Government has 
mandate to submit governmental bills to laws. In addition, any Member of the Riksdag can 
submit motions. The Riksdag votes on the proposals in accordance with the principle of 
majority.38 Hence, the principle of majority is crucial in the Swedish law-making process. 
Thus, a law can be said to reflect the will of the majority, as expressed by the voting in the 
Riksdag, and in extension, the voting during the elections. Inevitably, there is a principal 
concern to respect the minority without departing from the fundamental principle of majority 
rule and deviating from democratic rule.39  
 
2.2 On Sovereignty and the Nationality Principle 
The concept of sovereignty in international law covers a range of aspects. For the purpose of 
this thesis, the fundaments of sovereignty as to jurisdiction is relevant. Independent states 
                                                
35 Larsson and Bäck, 2008, p. 69. 
36 The Constitution of Sweden is available in translation (English) at 
http://www.riksdagen.se/en/SysSiteAssets/07.-dokument--lagar/the-constitution-of-sweden-160628.pdf/ 
(accessed April 17th 2017). 
37 See, for a brief summary of elections: Sveriges Riksdag, Så funkar riksdagen: Riksdagens uppgifter: Beslutar 
om lagar. Available at: http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/sa-funkar-riksdagen/riksdagens-uppgifter/beslutar-om-lagar/ 
(accessed 27th April 2017). 
38 See, for a brief summary on how laws are enacted in Sweden: Sveriges Riksdag, Så funkar riksdagen: 
Demokrati: Val till riksdagen. Available at: 
http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/sa-funkar-riksdagen/demokrati/val-till-riksdagen/, (accessed 27th April 2017). 
39 Larsson and Bäck, 2008, p. 32–33.  
 21 
possess sovereignty.40 Sovereignty is a form of power, inter alia “the power to exercise 
authority over all the individuals living in the state’s territory”.41 Intimately linked with 
territory, states have a duty not to intervene in the area of another state’s exclusive 
jurisdiction; this springs from the principle of sovereign equality.42 The system on equal states 
is said to emanate from 1648 and the Peace of Westphalia, where the basis for a secular 
European order was created. The international legal arena restrains sovereignty.43 Thus, a 
state’s accession to the ECHR entails limitations on sovereignty. From the concept of 
sovereignty emanates a discretion to decide matters44 – as described in the UN Charter Article 
2 (7) –  “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction”. This legal competence is therefore a 
part of sovereignty. In this thesis, the will to exercise jurisdiction beyond the territorial 
borders of Sweden, a legitimate practice under international law under certain circumstances, 
is relevant. States have jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce. In the context, it is 
enough to know that the latter jurisdiction confers upon states the right to enforce its laws 
when, exempli gratia, a Swedish citizen has committed a crime abroad. The basis for whom a 
state can enforce its criminal jurisdiction upon varies. Within a state’s territory, the territory 
will be the rationale. Outside the territory, the nationality principle justifies the enforcement 
of Swedish laws over Swedish citizens; Sweden can define the conduct of its citizens.45 
 
The Dutch organisation Women on Waves serves a good example on the rules of jurisdiction: 
the organisation provides abortifacients on a ship flying the Dutch flag and does so out on the 
high seas where – as a principal rule – the law of the flag state applies. Women on Waves 
thereby enables abortion for women living in states with restrictive abortion laws.46 However, 
the nationality principle may apply as the citizen who takes the abortifacients could still be 
liable to the enforcement of the laws of the citizen’s home country.47  
                                                
40 Mansell and Openshaw, 2013, p. 28–29.  
41 Mansell and Openshaw, 2013, p. 29. 
42 Article 2 (1) of the UN Charter explicitly provides that the principle of sovereign equality is the edifice of the 
entire UN structure and organisation. 
43 Mansell and Openshaw, 2013, p. 30. 
44 Mansell and Openshaw, 2013, p. 31. 
45 Renton Wolf, Shannon, Making Waves: Circumventing Domestic Laws on the High Seas, Article No. 7, In: 
Hastings Women’s Law Journal, Volume 14, Issue 1, Symposium Issue: Together: Bridging the Gaps in Legal 
Response to Domestic Violence, 2003, p. 114–115. 
46 Women on Waves, Who are we? Legal Position of Women on Waves. Available at:  
https://www.womenonwaves.org/en/page/611/legal-position-of-women-on-waves (accessed April 7th 2017). 
47 Renton Wolf, Shannon, Making Waves: Circumventing Domestic Laws on the High Seas, Article No. 7, In: 
Hastings Women’s Law Journal, Volume 14, Issue 1, Symposium Issue: Together: Bridging the Gaps in Legal 
Response to Domestic Violence, 2003, p. 114–115.  
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2.3 A Brief Note on the History of Human Rights 
A state bound by an international treaty must operate within what is permissible according to 
the treaty in question. International human rights law significantly qualifies the ambit of 
permissible actions and omissions of a state.48 Following the atrocities of the World War II, 
the UN was founded and shortly thereafter, in 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted the 
UDHR.49 A number of conventions on the subject of human rights was issued in the years that 
followed. During the postwar period, the international community realised the urgent need for 
other mechanisms to protect and develop the democratic order; universal suffrage and the 
democratic decision-making process had not prevented the atrocities the world had just 
witnessed. A system that could prevent the dismantling of democracy and at the same time 
protect the individual from abuses in the name of different doctrines, was necessary. 
International human rights treaties were created, natural law had a renaissance, and 
international institutions such as the Council of Europe, the UN50 and the precursor to EU saw 
the light of the day.51 As for the ECHR, the real development took place in the 1970’s, after 
states had began to accept the right to individual petition. The ECtHR began to interpret the 
ECHR broadly – as a true human rights constitution. Before this, the ECHR had a status of a 
document discussed among a smaller, initiated group.52 
 
2.4 Sweden and the ECHR 
2.4.1 The Nature of Sweden’s Obligations under the ECHR 
The full enjoyment of human rights requires of the duty-bearer, the state, adherence to the 
tripartite principle which includes a duty to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights. The 
tripartite construction entails both negative and positive obligations where the negative 
obligations tend to be branded as more traditional, being the duty to refrain from any 
interference. Positive duties require a more proactive role of the state.53 A stipulated right to 
abortion in national legislation can create a positive obligation to provide abortion – there 
                                                
48 Mansell and Openshaw, 2013, p. 31. 
49 Bates, 2010, p. 2.  
50 The UN had a less successful precursor in the League of Nations. 
51 Prop. 1993/94:117, p. 10–11. 
52 Bates, 2010, p. 10–16.  
53 Zillén, 2016, p. 113. 
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included, inter alia to set up a proper framework and hire personnel. An example of a 
negative obligation would be the duty for a state to refrain from dictating the minds of its 
citizens. However, the obligations blur; it is not always called for to define in exact terms the 
nature of an obligation when dealing with an impugned human rights violation. Indeed, this 
follows from another fundamental aspect of human rights: human rights are universal, 
indivisible, interrelated, and interdependent – there is no need to draw a sharp line.54 
Nevertheless, the varying nature of obligations implies a complex role of the state in the 
process to ensure every person her human rights. 
2.4.2 Sweden and the ECHR: Accession and Relationship 
The ECHR was signed on the 4th November 1950.55 The judgments delivered by the ECtHR 
are legally binding upon the states concerned, see Article 46 of the ECHR. Nevertheless, the 
ECtHR’s case law will often have implications for the general European development. The 
principle of stare decisis does not apply to the ECtHR as the living instrument doctrine guides 
the ECtHR in dealing with precedents. The doctrine entails that any given situation shall be 
interpreted in the light of present-day conditions and changes in society (such as science and 
altered morals) shall be taken into account in the assessment. However, legal certainty and 
foreseeability are also important values. Thus, the uniformity in the adjudication process its 
application of law is seldom altered – save for when compelling reasons are at hand. As the 
ECHR belongs to a system of human rights protection, the dynamic and evolutive application 
is crucial not to render the rights a bar to improvement.56 Notably, in the authority Ireland v. 
the United Kingdom57, the ECtHR recognised its judgments go beyond the ambit of the 
factual cases; the judgments function “more generally, to elucidate, safeguard and develop the 
rules instituted by the Convention, thereby contributing to the observance by the States of the 
engagements undertaken by them as Contracting Parties”.58 Hence, the reasoning and findings 
of one case will affect other signatory states. The above presented information also displays 
                                                
54 P. and S. v Poland, App. No. 57375/08, Judgment delivered by the ECtHR 10th October 2012, paras. 94–96.  
55 Today, the Convention has been amended through the sixteen Additional Protocols, see Council of Europe, 
Treaty Office: Search on Treaties: Human Rights (Conventions and Protocols Only). Available at: 
http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-treaties/-/conventions/treaty/results/subject/3 (accessed 3rd 
April 2017). Protocols No. 15–16 are not yet into force.  
56 Christine Goodwin v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, Judgment delivered by the ECtHR, 11th July 
2002, paras. 74–75. 
57 Ireland v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, Judgment delivered by the ECtHR 18th January 1978. 
58 Ireland v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, para. 154. See also”Partly concurring and partly dissenting 
opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque” in Herrmann v. Germany, App. No. 9300/07, Judgment delivered by the 
ECtHR 26th June 2012, for a well-written and concise note on stare decisis and the living instrument doctrine. 
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that changes in the jurisprudence are rare, yet not alien to the nature of the ECtHR 
jurisprudence. 
Sweden ratified both the ECHR and the optional individual right to petition on the 4th 
February 1952. In doing so, the function of the European Commission of Human Rights (now 
repealed and replaced by the ECtHR and its new function)59 in relation to Sweden was 
activated. The Commission’s main task was to reach conciliation. If conciliation failed, a non-
binding report was written on whether the given situation amounted to a rights violation.60 
Sweden did only initially acknowledged the competence of the Commission and did not admit 
the ECtHR full and binding jurisdiction until 1966.61 Noteworthy, Sweden submitted a 
reservation to Article 2 of the First Additional Protocol. The section of law guarantees the 
right to education and confers upon the states a duty to respect the right of parents to ensure 
education in conformity with the their own religious and philosophical conviction. Sweden 
made a reservation: (today no longer in force62) parents were not allowed to invoke their 
philosophical conviction in order to have their children exempted from certain teaching, nor 
could Sweden as a principal rule guarantee children exemption from the then mandatory 
teachings in Christianity.63  
 
Not until 1995, the ECHR was incorporated into Swedish law.64 One aim with the 
incorporation was the will to guarantee citizens a greater enjoyment of the ECHR rights.65 
Chapter 2 Article 19 of the Instrument of Government explicitly stipulates that no act of law 
or other provision may be adopted that contravenes Sweden’s undertakings under the ECHR. 
Sweden must interpret national law in accordance with the ECHR.66 This principle of 
interpretation requires of the national institutions a vigilance to the development in 
Strasbourg; the precedents of the ECtHR – the ECtHR’s position on law – is law in Sweden.67 
Besides holding the status of Swedish law, ECHR and the ECtHR constitute what may 
rightfully be described as the most powerful mechanism of human rights protection in 
                                                
59 The European Commission of Human Rights was abolished when Additional Protocol No. 11 came into force 
(Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
restructuring the control machinery established thereby). 
60 Prop. 1993/94: 117, p. 10–11. See also Sundberg and Sundberg, 1992, p. 14–15.  
61 Sterzel, 1993, p. 13. 
62 Reservation by Sweden to ETS No. 009, period covered: 18/05/1954 - 01/01/1995.	
63 Prop. 1993/94:117, p. 10–11. See also Sterzel, 1993, p. 13–14.  
64 As adopted in lag (1994:1219) om europeiska konventionen om de mänskliga rättigheterna och de 
grundläggande friheterna, see also prop. 1993/94:117, p. 1. 
65 Prop. 1993/94:117, p. 12. 
66 Decision by DO on E.G., 2014, p. 7. 
67 SOU 1997:41, p. 91. 
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Europe.68 However, the primary responsibility for adherence to the ECHR rights is bestowed 
upon the states, as the ECtHR surveillance is subsidiary to the national monitoring.69  
 
2.5 The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine 
In the exercise of its European surveillance and in the review of the states’ compliance with 
the ECHR, the doctrine of margin of appreciation is applied. The doctrine comes in to 
question when a potential interference with a right is examined: it falls within the assessment 
as to whether an impugned measure was necessary in a democratic society. For the 
requirements of the necessity test to be met, the national authorities most evince that the 
disputed measure was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The ECtHR will determine 
whether the national authorities in the particular circumstances have struck a fair balance 
between the interests at stake. Here, the states are afforded a margin of appreciation; its limits 
dictate the room for a state in a given situation to decide on the proportionality as to an 
impugned decision.70 The broader the margin, the smaller the scope for Strasbourg 
surveillance, the greater the national independency and the room to let prevail the national 
authorities’ interpretation.  Depending on the level of consensus within the Council of Europe 
states on a given issue, the doctrine will vary significantly. When applied, the margin of 
appreciation can either be wide or narrow – overall narrow when there is a consensus among a 
majority of the states, wide when there is no consensus, allowing for greater national 
differences.71 Notably, the doctrine often is decisive to the outcome in contentious moral 
issues such as abortion and euthanasia.72 In matters regarding the protection of health and 
safety on hospital wards, states are left a significant margin of appreciation, for the hospital 
managers are considered better equipped to make decisions on clinical safety than the 
                                                
68 This is so as the ECtHR, established as a permanent court, Article 19, has been equipped with a powerful 
mandate to interpret and apply the rights and freedoms in the Convention, Article 32. Noteworthy, if a dispute on 
the jurisdiction of the ECtHR appears, the ECtHR shall decide the matter, Article 32. The judgments are binding, 
Article 46 of the ECHR. See also SOU 1974:88, p. 3. Moreover, the Strasbourg system is oftentimes, within the 
human rights sphere, referred to as exactly this, the most powerful mechanism, see among others United Nations 
Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, United Nations Guide for Minorities, Pamphlet No. 7, 
Minority Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, p. 7.  
69 See for example Linda Steen v. Södermanlands läns landsting, p. 33. 
70 See for example Bayatyan v. Armenia, App. No. 234509/03, Judgment delivered by ECtHR 7th July 2011, 
paras. 112–128. This test is employed under a number of Articles in the ECHR, exempli gratia Articles 8–10.  
71 Lambert and others v. France, App. No. 46043/14, 5th June 2015, para. 145.  
72 See inter alia Bayatyan v. Armenia, App. No. 234509/03, Lambert and others v. France, App. No. 46043/14, 
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ECtHR.73 With respect to questions on the beginning of life, and inextricably, abortion, first, 
the ECtHR has not decided whether life within the meaning of Article 2 encompasses the 
unborn child. Second, it has not been decided if the unborn equals the legitimate aim “the 
protection of others” under Article 8 § 2, whereby an interference in the private life of the 
mother-to-be could possibly be justified.74 Further, the ECtHR has found no evidence that the 
signatory states intended to bind themselves to any interpretation on when life begins: 
therefore, the question is open.75 It is worth to note that a substantial majority amongst the 
Council of Europe states are in favour of access to abortion, even so on more numerous 
indications than just a risk to the life of the expectant mother. Nevertheless, the existing 
consensus has not been considered to render the margin of appreciation narrow with respect to 
abortion: it remains for the national authorities to balance the conflicting rights.76 All this is 
not without the ECtHR reservation to a potential use of an evolutive interpretation. This 
method of interpretation – the living instrument doctrine – allows the ECtHR to fully take into 
account the European development and deviate from earlier case law.77  
 
From the given information, we can establish that there exists a consensus on allowing 
abortion to a certain extent. Nevertheless, the non-existing consensus on when life begins – 
being the other interest that the interest of the expectant mother is weighed against – affects 
the margin and leaves it wide. The Council of Europe states do not ascribe the interests 
concerned the same weight, and have not reached unification as to the rights of the unborn. 
However, this is not set in stone, as future trends can potentially alter the current 
interpretation, as enabled through the living instrument doctrine. Lastly, if the margin of 
appreciation is found to be narrow and a state deviates from the European standard, 
convincing and compelling reasons must be advanced to justify the interference in question. 
In this, the state must establish that the impugned measure was prompted by a pressing social 
need.78  
 
 
                                                
73 Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 48420/10; 59842/10; 51671/10; 36516/10, Judgment 
delivered by the ECtHR 15th January 2013, para. 99.  
74 Vo v. France, App. No. 523924/00, Judgment delivered by the ECtHR, 8th July 2004, para. 76. 
75 Vo v. France, App. No. 523924/00, para. 76. 
76 A, B and C v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05, paras. 234–238.  
77 A, B and C v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05, para. 237.  
78 Bayatyan v. Armenia, App. No. 234509/03, para. 123. 
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2.6 A Note on Health Care and the Patient 
For the purposes of this thesis, it is enough to conclude that the state is the duty-bearer as to 
guarantee care, or more precisely, good care for the entire population. The notion good care 
covers a range of quality standards; the health care personnel bear a major medical onus in the 
realisation of good care for the population; health care personnel must be professional. There 
exists no exact definition on what constitutes good care, whereby the notion can be subject to 
and influenced by – in any given situation where care is provided – the health care 
personnel’s religious or moral conviction. The health care in Sweden puts the patient in focus; 
the product of a development during the last decades.79 Moreover, the right to health is 
guaranteed in inter alia the European Social Charter80. Noteworthy, the line between civil and 
political rights – as protected by the ECHR – and the economical and social sphere does not 
allow for an exact division. For certain, the latter sphere can fall within positive obligations of 
an ECHR right.81  
 
 
                                                
79 Zillén, 2016, p. 43–47. 
80 Council of Europe, European Social Charter, European Treaty Series - No. 35. Turin 18.X.1961. Sweden 
ratified the European Social Charter in 1962. The date for its entry into force was, interestingly, 26th February 
1965, http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list//conventions/treaty/035/signatures?p_auth=ZdltdKTH, 
(accessed 4th April 2017). 
81 Bates, 2010, p. 16. 
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3 The Section on Abortion 
3.1 History of Abortion in Sweden 
As mentioned, Sweden ratified the ECHR in 1952.82 The 1938 Abortion Act in an amended 
version was the current legislation in force. In this section a brief compilation on the history 
of abortion is given to facilitate a better understanding of the paragraphs following. 
Noteworthy, when Sweden adopted the ECHR, the notion of abortion being criminal 
governed the Swedish regulations. Today, the same wording of the ECHR applies, however 
the principle of free abortion governs the legislation in force. 
 
For centuries, abortion has been considered a prohibited act. It appears for the first time as an 
independent crime according to canon law in the 15th century. Death penalty was fully 
introduced as a penalty for the crime of abortion – no matter when carried out during the 
pregnancy – in the 18th century. Even attempt to abortion was criminalised. Parallel to this, 
laws from the 17th century stipulated that midwives were not allowed to perform abortions – 
midwives had to vow not to take any part in actions promoting abortion. Pharmacists and 
medical practitioners were prohibited from ordination of abortifacients. In the latter part of the 
19th century, sentences were reduced. Nevertheless, at the end of the century, the abortionist 
were punished more severely whilst sanctions for the woman were further relaxed.83 In 1921, 
the range of punishments were reduced for both the women and the abortionists – the 
assisting ones. The legislation was in force, save with a few amendments, until the 1938 
Abortion Act was adopted. Criminal responsibility could be asserted for abortion from the 
moment of conception and covered the entire period until the spontaneous birth started. 
However, if the woman’s life was at risk, abortion was not a criminal act. The collision of 
interests between the need to prevent the death of the woman and the interest of the unborn 
repealed the reprehensibility of the act, according to a general principle of law.84 The very 
same year the sentences were significantly lowered, 1921, was the year when the recently 
introduced legislation on universal suffrage, including all women, was applied for the first 
                                                
82 Prop. 1971:13, p. 2. 
83 SOU 1944:51 p. 13–14; SOU 2005:90, p. 37–38. The midwives’ vow is for certain nothing groundbreaking 
when reflecting upon the vow in the light of the Hippocratic oath. 
84 SOU 1944:51 p. 14–15; SOU 1935:15, p. 40. 
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time. As a curiosity, Kerstin Hesselgren became the first woman in the Riksdag in 1922.85 
Kerstin Hesselgren’s name is to be found amongst the signatures of the many motions that 
finally led the investigation which preceded the first law on abortion in Sweden, the 1938 
Abortion Act.86 For a moment, the section shall dwell on the considerations that formed the 
1938 Abortion Act. Examining these considerations will enable an understanding of what the 
law originated in. 
 
3.2 The 1938 Abortion Act 
The investigation commissioned (hereafter, in this chapter, denominated the committee) 
underlined the increase of abortions and found that whilst criminal abortions increased, so had 
contraceptive methods.87 In an attempt to understand why there had been an increase, 
different factors were considered. Possible reasons – amongst other thinkable such – was the 
alteration in the dominating conception of life, as a result of the (first) world war, the 
diminishing proliferation of Christian faith, the Christian view of life and the shift of sexual 
morals.88 When studying the preparatory works, the reasons for the high number of abortions 
become apparent. Economical struggles, the remainders of social stigma of pregnancy outside 
marriage, the difficulties on the labour market – a difficulty severely elevated by pregnancy 
and motherhood – the light view on men’s responsibility and a man’s “needs” – earlier 
remedied by the prostitute, but now also “cured” by the Madonna woman.89 Even though the 
number of prosecuted for criminal abortion was negligible, the dire reality spoke for itself.90 
Reality required a change. The legislator dealt with a dynamic period. One reason for the 
increase of desire to carry out abortions was the heightened approach for the individual to 
herself master her life, which according to the committee entailed a lowered capacity to meet 
the difficulties of life. One interesting conclusion was that the most difficult group of women 
to persuade into refrain from carrying out abortion was women from what today would be 
considered middle-class. For those with recently elevated standards, childbirth could risk a 
                                                
85 Hamrin-Thorell, Ruth, Kerstin Hesselgren In: Svenskt biografiskt lexiko. Digital version available at 
https://sok.riksarkivet.se/Sbl/Presentation.aspx?id=12947, (accessed April 16th 2017). 
86 SOU 2005:90, p. 38–39.  
87 SOU 1935:15, p. 17–18. 
88 SOU 1935:15, p. 21–22. 
89 SOU 1935:15, p. 21–26.  
90 SOU 1935:15, p. 19. 
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severe decrease of the standards just won.91 The new sexual morals were considered a peril to 
nativity and society. The increasing opinion that parents have a right to decide when and 
whether at all they want to have children, that came with the rising use of birth control, was 
explicitly condemned – the regrettable unwillingness of women to adapt to and accept 
pregnancy was likely to further increase.92  However, as abortion was as a severe evil to 
society, the practice had to be curbed.93 By social-welfare reforms, underlying poor conditions 
were to be eliminated. The reforms were to be paired with an introduction of the first abortion 
legislation and a relaxed penal law.94  
 
As a response to opinions that had questioned the role of society as protector of the unborn, 
the committee reported those arguments as simplified and devastating; for the protection of 
the unborn was certainly incumbent upon society. The committee linked the protection of the 
unborn to the roots of the independent criminalisation of abortion and canon law. According 
to Christian tradition, the unborn life95 possesses a soul. The mentioned perception of life later 
transcended the territory of canon law and entered the ambit of civil – bourgeois – law in 
Christian countries; it transformed into a general duty for society to protect the sanctity of life. 
The duty came to serve as a fundamental principle in especially criminal law – no matter the 
factual and moral worth of the individual whom the foetus later would become.96  
 
The word patronising might encapsulate the investigation properly. The aim with the proposal 
was to impede abortions and alleviate the severe social conditions for women. Illegal 
abortions had to be stopped, yet it was more important to impede abortions in general. 
Therefore, decriminalising the act of abortion in principle was not in question – this would 
change the general morals as to abortions, whereby the abortions would increase. As this was 
not acceptable, the law had to be firm and condemn the immanent reprehensibility of the act. 
Only if a true collision of interests was at hand, the mother’s could prevail.97 Eventually, the 
                                                
91 SOU 1935:15, p. 21–22. 
92 SOU 1935:15, p. 22–23, 27. 
93 SOU 1935:15, p. 86. 
94 SOU 1937:6, p. 19–20.  
95 Initially, the perception of when life came in possession of a soul differed between the genders. Latter, the 
criminalisation of abortion in canon law was extended in order to encompass protection of unborn life not in 
possession of a soul, consequently, all abortions were criminalised, see SOU 1935:15 p. 87. 
96 SOU 1935:15, p. 86–87. 
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finished proposal comprised four abortion indications: medical, social, humanitarian 
(conception as a result of inter alia rape and other exploitation of the woman), and eugenic.98 
 
The 1938 Abortion Act entered into force without the social indication, due to protests and 
firm belief in the introduction of social reforms that were to eliminate causes for abortions 
with social motifs.99 Noteworthy, the eugenic and the social indication were subject to 
scrutiny by another investigation (hereafter, in this chapter, the commission).100  Their 
opinions illustrate the view given precedence at the time. The commission found the social, 
medical, and humanitarian indications mainly called for by the interests of the woman, 
whereby abortion on eugenic and some humanitarian grounds – based on mental deficiency – 
was in the interest of society. The commission agreed on the need for a eugenic indication and 
held that there existed a pressing and direct social need to prevent the genesis of a “deficient 
offspring”.101 The report by the commission in 1937 contained explicitly patronising 
writings.102 An aspect constantly underlined was the need to restore the morals in accordance 
with the principles enshrined in the penal law. The commission was convinced that danger 
was ahead if the penal law and its canon were subject to further relaxation: the general sense 
of justice would change to accept abortion the grounds of a woman’s free will, if nothing was 
done. A point of view that promoted individualism could not be tolerated; indeed, to let 
women decide over their bodies in a manner juxtaposed to her female instincts would hurt 
both society and the woman herself. The commission agreed with the committee in that 
freedom for women to decide on abortion was not the solution to the difficulties women faced 
and nor the answer to the combat against charlatan doctors and illegal abortions. A potential 
increase in abortions and the acceptance of the practice was a risk not to be taken, but a 
possible scenario to assiduously prevent by enforcing strong morals.103 Therefore, the 
commission was not in favour of the pure social indication, but could accept the medical 
indication with social elements.104  
                                                
98 SOU 1935:15, p. 9.  
99 SOU 1944:51 p. 36. 
100 SOU 1937:6, p. 3–4.  
101 SOU 1937:6, p. 4.  
102 One inapprehensible and astounding example: The sterilisation of ’poor’, ’deficient’, ’imbecile’ individuals 
was subject to discussion, where the commission first established that abortion is a lesser of encroachment than 
sterilisation for the woman, only to find that permitting abortion shall be done with more care than when 
permitting sterilisation – the interests of society to prevent from being the deficient offspring weighs heavy, as to 
impede the woman from ever again giving birth, but the interests of the unborn (no matter when during 
pregnancy) weighs heavier, before permitting abortion, see SOU 1937:6, p. 5–6. 
103 SOU 1937:6, p. 17–18, 32–34. 
104 SOU 1937:6, p. 34.  
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The investigation was Janus faced; the sanctity of life did not extend to “deficient 
individuals”.105 Thus, we observe a position where a morally educative and indeed, by 
religion marked, interpretation of what the interests of society were, prevailed. The penal law 
on the prohibition on abortion for both the woman and the ones assisting her remained in 
force. Thus, the 1938 Abortion Act constituted an exception to the general prohibition. 
Nevertheless, the 1938 Abortion Act was not paired with the social reforms that had been 
predicted during its preparation. In 1946, a sociomedical indication was introduced and the 
penal law was relaxed – despite a powerful resistance. The opposition found that abortion was 
even more unjustifiable on social indications. Thus, society had to maintain the general sense 
of justice shaped in accordance with the rights of the unborn. Society had to condemn the 
assertion that a woman should be allowed to decide for herself whether she wanted a child. 
Mainly the women’s lobby was in favour of the sociomedical indication.106 Noteworthy, Karl 
Schlyter, a prominent Swedish jurist, was an activist in favour of the introduction of a social 
indication already in the 1938 Abortion Act.107 
 
The investigation commissioned in 1941 began by concluding that the 1938 Abortion Act had 
not rendered a change in the devastating statistics on illegal abortions.108 As the commission 
was one from a population policy, this permeated the report. It was noted that the focus used 
to be on the penal law, however the focal point tended more to the social issues.109 Illustrative 
of this is the reference to Gunnar Myrdal110 and his point on the need to describe the reality of 
the abortion-seeking woman, for the purpose of truly concurring the problem. Understanding 
the subjective motifs for abortion was a part to this, even though the report did not find the 
subjective motifs as truly revealing the causes of the problem. The inquest laid a mosaic of so-
called subjective reasons for abortion that were known: fear of war, fear of lower standards 
paired with unwillingness to change standards, pure laziness, economical reasons, age and so 
forth. The deficient individuals, however, had a proper rationale for their will to abort.111 The 
great importance to end all abortions was stressed.112 It was found that the view of abortions 
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as criminal in nature had to be preserved: the general sense of justice required that abortionists 
were sentenced.113 
 
Abortion remained subject to constant reports and motions. In 1950, yet another state 
investigation was commissioned, however not with a mandate to submit proposals as to 
changes in the abortion legislation.114 The investigation revealed a polemic debate; the voices 
heard in the public discussion attacked one another without finding a solution. Arguments 
from perspectives of population policy, medicine, and religion had been prominent, whereas 
the woman’s will and autonomy had been less so. More generally, two strands existed where 
one stressed the sanctity of life and principally rejected all abortion indications, alleging such 
laws to countenance infanticide, save from, as supported by the Church and the Christian 
love, when the mother’s life was at risk. This side oftentimes argued potentials risks abortion 
entailed, such as sterility and a deep post-abortion anxiety when the woman felt she had 
deviated from her motherly instincts; all this could paralyse her life and leave her invalid. 
Such horrible effects and the weakening morals were to be prevented by severe punishment, 
however especially severe for the person assisting. Indeed, the unborn could grow to become 
an extraordinary useful individual. The other side forwarded the social situation for women, 
liberty and the right to one’s own body. This strand meant that a woman’s interests triumphed 
those of the unborn; the unborn had no right to be born. The commission noted that the debate 
had strong tendencies to wander from the actual matter to the question of individual freedom 
contra society’s interests.115 In addition, risks with counselling were emphasised. Many 
women avoided counselling in fear of meeting personnel pressuring them to change their 
minds. Exempli gratia, women who suffered personal stress and difficulties in life could be 
dismissed as hysteric and infantile. One example provided displays a woman who was denied 
abortion on the basis that she sought abortion on grounds of convenience. Many women – as 
the statistics displayed clearly – turned to illegal abortionists.116 It is worth to note that the 
Church of Sweden expressed the need to care for the conscience and anxiety of the health care 
personnel forced to carry out abortions.117 A fifth abortion indication was introduced in 1963, 
allowing abortion when a suspected foetal damage was at hand.118  
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The legal framework during the Poland case prescribed penalties for abortion, save for 
abortion permitted in accordance with any of the five indications.119 A change from 1946 had 
equipped the courts with a possibility to exempt from penalty a woman who had killed her 
foetus when extenuating circumstances were at hand.120 Moreover, Chapter 3 Article 11 in the 
recently introduced Penal Code prescribed that the woman could only be prosecuted if special 
reasons existed.121 Chapter 3 Article 4 taken with Chapter 23 Article 4 of the Penal Code 
prescribed both the acts of the ones assisting the woman and the acts of the woman as 
criminal offences. The black letter of the law provided no ground for abortion on the basis of 
a woman’s right to privacy. Thus, a woman had to resign herself to pregnancy or obtain an 
illegal abortion, either in the obscure within the nation or by crossing the borders in accessing 
an abortion abroad.  
 
3.3 A Journey to Poland, 1965 
3.3.1 What Happened? 
Early winter 1965. In the wake of a recent conference on “Sex and society”122 in Stockholm, 
Sweden, a debate flared up on the subject of a particular presentation held at the conference. 
A young woman held a highly personal presentation of her trip to Poland for the sole purpose 
of carrying out an abortion. The woman revealed the motifs: neither she, nor her partner, was 
ready for having a child. Subsequently, her story came to the attention of the public and ended 
up on the Prosecutor General’s desk. On 13th February 1965 the Prosecutor General Emanuel 
Walberg answered a missive sent to him by the Chief Prosecutor in Jönköping municipality: 
Could a Swedish woman who had obtained an abortion outside the country be prosecuted 
according to Swedish law? The Prosecutor General adduced that the Swedish Penal Code 
provided for prosecution in Swedish courts in the current case. The principal rule stated, the 
Penal Code Chapter 2 Article 2, that a Swedish citizen should be prosecuted in accordance 
with Swedish law if he or she had committed a crime outside the country. Generally, for such 
matters, a special decree was required for prosecution. An exception existed if the criminal act 
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had been directed at a Swedish interest; then no decree was required. The Prosecutor General 
found that a woman who had obtained an abortion outside the country was punishable 
according to Swedish law. To pursue a measure with the purpose of driving out a foetus of a 
Swedish woman’s body – an action considered directed against the foetus – was to be 
considered an action directed against Swedish interests. Therefore, according to the 
Prosecutor General, the question on prosecution in the particular case did not need to be 
submitted the Swedish Government. By citing the legal scholar Agge, it was emphasized that 
a citizen was not to let go of the morals of the home country when abroad; the nationality 
principle was applicable. In addition, those who assisted the women were also punishable in 
Sweden. The Prosecutor General added that the lack of possibility to trace the perpetrators in 
Poland amounted to an additional special reason for prosecution of the women involved.123 As 
will be seen, this rule had long been an impediment for the Swedish courts to prosecute 
women for the crime of abortion. However, the Prosecutor General now had found a special 
reason to deviate from that standard. Moreover, the provision – Chapter 3 Article 11 of the 
Penal Code –  only made possible to refrain from prosecution of the women, not the ones who 
had assisted them – Hans Nestius, in this case. Hans Nestius was the one who had helped the 
women with contacts in Poland. He was punishable in accordance with the Penal Code, 
Chapter 23 Article 4, for complicity.124  
 
The matter was thereafter delegated to the Chief Prosecutor in Stockholm, who decided to 
open up a preliminary investigation.125 A search of the premises in Hans Nestius’ home was 
decided on and executed. In the days that followed, a number of letters, from renowned 
personalities and influential fellowships, arrived to the Swedish Government and the Riksdag. 
In a letter signed Ingvar Carlsson126, the Social Democratic Youth pleaded the Government to 
declare the woman and the involved free from prosecution.127 Sala municipality protested in a 
letter to the hunt of young women and claimed the public opinion was clear on the matter; 
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author associations protested to the measures, measures that only suited a police state.128 One 
voice was highly likely crucial in the case: the voice of the criminal law professor Alvar 
Nelson, as embodied in his article in Stockholms-Tidningen on 21st February, 1965. Alvar 
Nelson suggested Kungl. Maj:t to use the rare and seldom applied legal institute abolition. 
Abolition, suggested Alvar Nelson, should be used as it made possible to refrain from 
prosecuting the involved persons.129 Hans Nestius lawyer argued for abolition, held that the 
public opinion demanded a liberal abortion law and critised the judgment of the Prosecutor 
General: it was not for him but for the Swedish courts to decide on what a Swedish interest 
was.130 Other letters and the main traces observed in the debate are presentated in the section 
infra, 3.3.2 The Poland Affair Debate. 
 
26th February 1965. Only a few days after the first letter on the matter had arrived at the 
Prosecutor General’s desk, Kungl. Maj:t decided to order abolition.131 Thereby, the ones 
involved were freed from further judicial attention. The Prosecutor General agreed with the 
decision; he held the circulation in media of the law had had effect on the general prevention. 
After the widespread debate, the Swedish people knew the general prohibition on abortion 
extended to Swedish citizens worldwide, whereby prosecution was unnecessary.132 
Noteworthy, to decide on abolition appertains to a political mandate. The decision by Kungl. 
Maj:t was a constitutionally anchored decision by a political organ – an intervention in the 
judicial field. 
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3.3.2 The Poland Affair Debate 
Before diving into the materials, three things must be brought to the attention of the reader. 
First, many arguments circulated around the potential use of abolition, the search of premises 
in Hans Nestius’ home, and general discussions on how correct the Prosecutor General’s 
interpretation was. These arguments gravitated around the individuals in the Poland case. 
Some of these arguments will be tended to in detail, however, the main focus in this section is 
to trace the patterns in the debate in relation to abortion; to identify the dimensions wherein 
the general sense of justice was reflected. As will be seen, the two – the Poland case and the 
abortion issue – were not separated in the debate; the voices transitioned to debate principles 
that governed and should govern the Swedish abortion legislation. Second, the newspaper 
press and media coverage seem to have played a great part in the course of events. Inevitably, 
sensation journalism was all over the tabloids, paired with a sincere debate. From the archives 
it appears as all Sweden had an interest in the matter. Some of these less wise arguments will 
appear in the amplification that follows, as they contribute to the map of the debate. Third, the 
presentation is not chronological. However, all the arguments presented appeared between 
February and early March, 1965.  
 
The decision to carry out a search of the premises in Hans Nestius home was met with sharp 
critique. Notably, preparatory works to the abortion laws were invoked and interpreted as 
guaranteeing the best for women involved.133 Hans Nestius and his attorney Franck argued an 
interpretation of the 1938 Abortion where the law was directed at the charlatan doctors for the 
purpose of protecting women; Nestius repeatedly held he had helped the women. Thus, as he 
had helped women to undergo safe abortions by qualified doctors in Poland, a potential 
prosecution was unimaginable.134 As seen, this interpretation is not strict in line with what has 
been shown supra as to the content of the preparatory works.  
 
Especially upsetting among the public was the lack of coherence in morals as to the 
prosecution of illegal abortions in Sweden and the Poland affairs. The nebulous interpretation 
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of criminality abroad was also a cause of excitement and many questioned the prersevation of 
morals when abroad – a linked question that had repercussions in the Riksdag.135 Arguments 
on whether or not the interpretation of the law had been correct flourished, where some held 
the general sense of justice in Sweden to favour an approach where the suspected should be 
freed from all suspicion. Among the names Ingemar Hedenius stands out. He accused the 
Prosecutor General for having interpreted the law without the conscience of an enlightened 
mind.136 Others were horrified over evanescent Christian morals and praised the Christian 
principles that governed the coexistence – and restrictive abortion policies.137 In an interview 
with Emanuel Walberg, he underlined what had got lost in the debate: the difference between 
on the one hand law and the obligation to prosecute and on the other moral values presented 
by a temporary opinion.138  
 
The main legal argument for the use of abolition as shown supra was that the women and the 
other ones involved were in good faith as to the legality of abortion abroad. In the light of 
this, the Prosecutor General’s declaration that the impossibility to prosecute the Polish doctors 
amounted to such a special reason as required according to Swedish law in order to allow 
prosecution of the women, caused indignation.139 Another root to indignation was the 
argument on general prevention as a reason for prosecution. Many could not accept that a 
Swedish woman’s pregnancy came within the Swedish state interests – that the foetus and a 
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woman’s body ‘belonged’ to the state. This would amount to, as one writer concluded, a 
human rights violation. The issue was about a woman’s right to own her own body, thus her 
opinion should prevail.140 Indeed, a common argument was that which emphasised a woman’s 
capacity to make decisions as to her own life and body – that a woman only as a last resort 
would turn to abortion. These arguments expressed a clear understanding of women’s social 
situation. In relation to such arguments, ridicules of Sweden as a nanny state, a police state 
that exercised undue control over its citizens, had a tendency to occur.141 Many political youth 
associations commented on the matter: Liberal youth associations sent letters the office of the 
Prosecutor General and urged the authorities to respect the integrity and protection of the 
individual; one liberal youth association criticised the expressed wish to gain a general 
preventive effect by prosecuting the involved and invoked a fundamental principle of a 
democracy: to afford priority to individual rights.142 The student’s association Verdandi in 
Uppsala demanded an investigation for a new abortion act.143 The Social Democratic Youth 
wing wrote a thunderous satire: the Prosecutor General was an envoy of God; the Swedish 
abortion law and its century-old morals were the celestial words of God and no one should 
infringe God’s law in the democratic state of Sweden. The Prosecutor General was righteous 
and a good Christian, serving the reactionary forces in Sweden.144 Noteworthy, a Polish 
doctor held that the personal liberty was lacking in Sweden.145 Given the Polish abortion 
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legislation of today and the 1975 Abortion Act, this quote certainly emphasises how vigorous 
the changes have been.  
 
The debate was one between progressive and conservative forces – the youth demanded the 
dissolving of archaic sexual morals whilst others swore the need for further fortification of 
time-honoured morals.146 A Swedish doctor sent to the Prosecutor General an article from the 
periodical Himmat on abortion and claimed that the debate on free illegal abortion was a 
symptom of the disease in the Swedish cultural debate. Arguments on statistics were turned 
to: relaxed abortion laws entailed an increased number of abortion operations; surveys had 
disclosed that some women suffered from feelings of guilt post abortion. The article stated in 
clear print the sexual morals many probably held on to: sex was not to be used for pleasure 
without responsibilities. A nation’s attitude to sexual morals affected the national progress, 
and liberal abortion laws had proved dangerous to the birth rates in many nations.147  
 
As observed, many found that the event brought attention to the abysmal difference in opinion 
between authorities and people. An illustrative example comes from the socialistic press, 
where people as the ones setting the moral agenda was argued for strongly.148 Arbitrariness in 
that the 1938 Abortion Act sanctioned certain selected types of murders were criticised; the 
arbitrariness was also highlighted by reference to the possibility for women with the right 
contacts – women from bourgeois families – to obtain the necessary attestation from two 
doctors, whilst women from other social groups struggled with this – the law was a class 
law.149 An abortion law fitting the social reality was called for.150 As evident, the happenings 
bordered to the ongoing debate on a potential liberalisation of the 1938 Abortion Act; those 
who participated constantly added and touched upon arguments that rather belonged to the 
bigger debate. Eventually – after the decision on abolition – the debate comprised of many 
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conclusions as to the people’s demand for a liberal abortion law. A striking observation was 
that the public opinion showed the 1938 Abortion Act not to be in line with the general sense 
of justice: the abortion law had to be revised in order to truly move within the democratic 
order; only a totalitarian state forced female citizens to give birth: the law had to undergo 
liberalisation.151  
 
The preliminary investigation was closed on the 26th of February 1965.152 Some held that 
Hans Nestius had had his ‘plan’ realised – post Poland, the Swedish debate was occupied by 
the liberalisation of the abortion laws. Conditions for abortion-seeking women with attestation 
from the Medical Board had been disclosed: the medical personnel moralised over abortion 
and ill-treated women – the representatives of the state let show their private morals at work, a 
practice condemned in some media; a practice denied by other voices.153 Hans Nestius praised 
the good that had come with the enlightenment through the Poland case: people had now 
heard women’s stories on the arbitrary practices. Lars Engström – chairman of the Medical 
Board – had appeared in media where he had presented an open interpretation of the 1938 
Abortion Act, which opened up for a liberalisation. Lars Engström had also informed on the 
actual and arbitrary application of the 1938 Abortion Act, and Nestius claimed that all this 
had made Sweden ready to finally declare Swedish women to be of age.154 
 
After the decision to commission an investigation on a new abortion law had been announced, 
the coverage in media continued to link the two questions.155 Christian opinion claimed the 
psychotic propaganda in the Poland affairs had reached the Government; the legislative remit 
was a compilation of Herman Kling’s liberal posture – in juxtaposition to the proper and true 
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public opinion, which remained that of life’s sanctity.156 One notice in Svenska Dagbladet 
held the public opinion had not shifted and stressed a necessity to separate the Poland affair 
from the abortion question. Rather, it was argued, the decreasing number of abortions upheld 
the 1938 Abortion Act and its rationale: protection of the foetus.157 Not all opinions equalled 
the public opinion as to the Poland affair with a public opinion in favour of a liberal abortion 
law.158 For example, some called for further social securities and options for women in order 
to strengthen women to not abort and protect the unborn in accordance with public morality. 
A liberal abortion law would have devastating consequences for the population number; it 
would relax the sexual morals in a dangerous way.159  
3.3.3 The Riksdag Discussions 
The Poland affair echoed in the Riksdag. Examined by the Committee on the Constitution160 
opinions were put forward on the abolition decision in relation to Hans Nestius and another, 
more peripheral person, who had been suspected for having mediated contacts with Polish 
clinics. Especially objectionable was that people had been doing business of abortion trips, as 
the public could interpret this as an acceptance from the state to make business of connecting 
women to abortion clinics abroad. Thus the extent of the decision was offensive to the sense 
of justice.161 During the audit in the Riksdag, the legality of the abolition decision and the 
remarkably short period between the proposal to use abolition and the abolition decision was 
the main topic discussed. The Minister of Justice held that a simple waiver of prosecution for 
the women would not have been enough.162 The prosecutors and police officers involved had 
only acted in accordance with their duties set forth by Swedish laws. By using abolition, the 
needs of the women involved had been put forward, as they thereby were freed from any 
further interrogations and publicity. Kling quoted a newspaper item in which the standpoint of 
some Members of the Riksdag was expressed: The Minister of Justice was asked to correct 
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the situation, as the world had been turned upside down by Swedish authorities. Moreover, 
the Minister of Justice explained that he had, before the Poland affair, prepared a proposal to 
commission an investigation of the 1938 Abortion Act.163 However, consensus had existed 
with regard to that the women involved had acted in error of law; they had believed it was 
lawful to obtain abortion in Poland; Kling was met with support in his statement that abolition 
was the only way to fully protect the women involved.164 In studying these official 
documents, it is perfectly clear that the newspaper headlines reached the public chambers of 
Sweden. For example, during the Riksdag debate, the Minister of Justice referred to 
newspapers and pamphlets that had demanded liberal abortion laws.165 One representative of 
the Social Democrats established that the Poland affair had attracted the attention of the 
public, media, doctors, jurists, politicians, and many others; the debate had been characterised 
by confusion, even among the professionals.166 Moreover, emphasised the delegate, the 
decision on abolition was taken in order to protect the women involved from the stress in 
participating as witnesses in the preliminary investigation or, following thereafter, a trial.167  
A liberal delegate accused the decision on abolition to be a result of propaganda and the force 
of public opinion – a people’s court had decided the matter.168  
3.3.4 Post the Poland Case: the Road to the 1975 Abortion Act 
Only a week after the decision on abolition, 5th March 1965, the Minister of Justice Herman 
Kling (by office Head of the Ministry of Justice), received a delegation to appoint an 
investigation for the purposes of reviewing the current abortion laws.169 As the investigation 
was commissioned (hereafter, the 1965 Abortion Committee), Kling emphasised that the 
interests and feelings of the woman were to be given due consideration in the investigation; 
the time was right to look into the possibilities of a liberalisation. A major part of the remit 
was to examine if the woman’s will – not the will ascribed to her by the authorities – should 
be the governing element; if so, whether the criminalisation in regard to the woman should be 
lifted.170 The features submitted in the 1965 Abortion Committee came to underpin the 1975 
Abortion Act, which, save a few edits, remain in force as of today.171  
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The penal laws long had upheld a woman’s duty to accept pregnancy. However, the 1965 
Abortion Committee found that this duty had been questioned repeatedly with regard to the 
sake of the woman. Nevertheless, morality and general prevention had prevailed under the 
1938 Abortion Act.172 In a compilation of the most common arguments, the commission 
observed that those pro liberal abortion laws had stressed that the penal legislation was an 
impediment for society to get to the charlatans. Counter to this, the low number of prosecuted 
women and the relaxed penal legislation was pointed to. Further, the potential deterrent effect 
– the need to keep in force the criminalisation due to reasons of general prevention – had been 
argued to fail: Women continued to carry out abortions no matter the status of the law; the 
penal law made the abortion regulation arbitrary due to the haphazard application; it put 
women in perilous situations.173  
 
The working group of the Department of Justice, in shaping the law, emphasised a need to 
curb abortions even though the introduction of a liberal abortion law lay ahead. The Minister 
of Justice at the time – the Social Democrat Lennart Geijer – concluded the abortion debate 
had intensified in connection to the Poland trips.174 The number of abortions on sociomedical 
grounds amounted to more than 75 percent of all abortions, in comparison to the 10 percent 
these comprised in 1965. Geijer stressed this was because such abortions were decided by two 
doctors; hence, doctors’ personal and subjective view on abortion governed the abortion 
field.175 Geijer further noted that the criminal provision as regards the woman and abortion 
had ceased to be applied. Gender roles had changed, the sexual morals had altered, and many 
rationales that had upheld the 1938 Abortion Act was outdated. The main method for birth 
control was the use of contraceptives. The old way of thinking that had justified before the 
population a criminalisation of abortion, were no longer viable.176 The woman should through 
the new legislation be freed from the obligation to tolerate the pregnancy, as earlier imposed 
by the state: the right to abortion should be introduced, in order to protect women from 
charlatans.177 Therefore, the new act should embody contemporary values. Geijer expressed 
worries as the willingness of doctors to issue abortion attestations varied throughout the 
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country; these varying practices could generate that women, despite a new law, could be 
affected still and suffer impediments to obtain abortion. Therefore, Geijer criticised the 
proposal by the 1965 Abortion Committee to let committees, or sometimes doctors, decide on 
abortion even in the new, more liberal law.178  
 
Many consultation bodies meant that the proposal had not investigated the collision of 
interests between the foetus and a woman’s right to decide over her own body. Geijer did not 
agree on this; the ethical aspect had been subject to discussion since time immemorial.179 
Social aspects had become crucial; it was for society to assist the woman in accordance with 
her decision. Geijer found support to the liberalisation in both the gradual enlargements of the 
1938 Abortion Act and the development since the middle of the 1960’s. A woman’s role had 
changed; society should entrust women the right to make their own decisions.180 As the new 
act that had been proposed by the 1965 Abortion Committee contained indications and a 
committee procedure, yet again, it was deemed not in line with the principle of women’s 
autonomy. The final proposal presented in the government bill came without indications and 
contained the right to abortion.181 As the criminal provision on abortion for the woman did not 
find support in public opinion, was a peril and served no improvement as to general 
prevention, it was left in history. Moreover, this was reflected in the total abstention of 
prosecution.182 
 
The 1975 Abortion Act changed the nature of the laws on abortion. Still echoed the eternal 
necessity to decrease the number of abortions in the preparatory works. Abortion as a harmful 
practice was confirmed.183 From having been an exception to a criminal provision, the law 
became civil and public in nature. The new law stipulated a freedom for the individual to 
decide for herself whether to have an abortion as well as the right to obtain one.184 Today, 
every woman, no matter citizenship, can access abortion in Sweden.185 However, the 1975 
Abortion Act does contain a certain stance for the unborn; after week 18, an abortion must be 
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prompted by compelling reasons; the National Board of Health and Welfare must endorse 
abortion.186  
 
With regards to the official posture in the issue of abortion, Christian tradition has historically 
been characterised by two interpretations. The first tradition reasoned that sexuality per se is a 
peril and an evil. In order to truly be a good Christian, observance of continence was a must. 
Inevitably, abortion was an evil phenomenon. A second tradition perceived sexuality as God’s 
gift, but the enjoyment of sex as a pure pleasure could not reign as sexuality was strictly 
designated for the matrimonial orb. In principal, abortion was an evil, but there were 
situations when abortion could result in the lesser of two evils – when the pregnancy was a 
result of rape or posed a risk of death for the woman.187 In the 1960’s, the position within the 
Church of Sweden moved between these two poles. A common denominator was however the 
aversion towards the free choice – an aversion that would become subject to revision. 
However, not even the Church of Sweden was spared from the upheavals in the sexuality 
debate and the rather germinal legal events during the 1960’s. During the 1960’s, the opinion 
within the Church of Sweden was shattered; some movements showed tendencies towards an 
understanding and acceptance of the difficulties that came with an unwanted pregnancy. The 
posture of the Church of Sweden in the consultation response to the 1975 Abortion Act 
preparatory works did however not reflect the new tendencies; the church favoured the 
sanctity of life.188 Today, the Church of Sweden emphasises social support and other 
measures to strengthen the woman as the church has found it impossible to change public 
opinion: there exists no alternative to a woman’s right to decide for herself.189  
 
3.4 Abortion under the ECHR 
Knowing that Sweden has a liberal abortion law, the rules governing abortion under the 
ECHR will now be turned to. As earlier mentioned, Sweden had ratified the ECHR at the time 
of the Poland affair. The values brought out during and after the Poland case as enshrined in 
the 1975 Abortion Act remain the underlying values in the field. It will appear from this 
section that these values also govern how ECHR is interpreted in a Swedish context.  
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It is curious to begin this section with an observation made in an item published in Svensk 
Juristtidning, in 1979, where one ‘unimaginable’ example on how the Council of Europe 
system could show itself perilous to the democratic exercise of power in each state. If the 
ECtHR was to rule on a national abortion law’s compatibility with the right to life, Article 2 
ECHR, as the rights are broadly formulated, the judges would rule based on their own 
conscience and value-conviction. This method is more akin to the act of legislating than 
interpretation and adjudication; legislating is an act reserved for the national legislator.190 
Indeed, the ECtHR is equipped with a mandate to interpret the ECHR as a means to secure for 
individuals under the jurisdiction of the signatory states their human rights; this follows from 
Articles 1 and 19 of the ECHR. Through this interpretation, the ECHR is under constant 
development; the broad formulation of the rights and freedoms renders a versatile 
protection.191  Noteworthy, abortion on other grounds than to save the woman’s life was at the 
time of ECHR’s creation in principle criminalised all over Europe.192 From a strict literal 
reading, the ECHR comprises no independent right to abortion. Nevertheless, issues related to 
abortion have appeared before the ECtHR a number of times.193 Already in 1976, the former 
European Commission of Human Rights found abortion laws to interfere with a woman’s 
private life – as is protected by Article 8.194 However, jurisprudence leaves that termination of 
pregnancy does not exclusively pertain to the woman’s private life as the pregnancy 
constitutes a close connection between the woman and the foetus.195 Thus, her rights must be 
weighed with potential competing rights; the ECtHR is oftentimes to strike a balance between 
invoked rights of the foetus, in accordance with public opinion,196 and those of the woman.197 
As explained supra under section 2.5 The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine, the competence 
to decide on matters related to when life begins and ends falls within the margin of 
appreciation of states, given that due weight is afforded to all interests.198 What the states 
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consider as the weightier interest varies. Thus, the outcome will vary depending on the 
interest promoted by each national law. Inevitably, cases on abortion before the ECtHR 
generally originate in countries where abortion is severely restricted, as Poland and Ireland.199 
Exempli gratia, the ECtHR has found that, as Ireland’s restrictive abortion laws are rooted in 
“the profound moral views of the Irish people as to the nature of life”200 the balance struck 
between the protection of the unborn vis-à-vis a woman’s private life by Ireland in forming 
the abortion law is fair.201  
As the margin of appreciation is drawn on when the ECtHR carries out the test under Article 
8, a short passage on the test is in place. First, the notion respect for private life covers 
negative and positive obligations.202 Second, Article 8 is a relative right; Article 8 § 2 governs 
limitations. An interference must be prescribed by law and be necessary in a democratic 
society on one of the given grounds in order to be justified; the impugned measure must 
pursue one or more of the aims set forth by the Article.203 During all other circumstances – 
save for times of war204– the measure will amount to an infringement.  
When ECtHR tests if the impugned measure was necessary in a democratic society, it looks as 
to whether the measure was proportionate in order to achieve the aim invoked by the state. 
Here, the accorded margin of appreciation appears, it is a part of the balancing between 
competing interests. The interests of the individual compete with those of the community, and 
the states are left a broad margin of appreciation in this proportionality test.205 Here, the 
public opinion on abortion qualifies under the concept of the interest of the community as a 
whole and can originate in exempli gratia a population policy or the dominating religious 
order.206 The ECtHR has found that Article 8 does not give rise to a general right to 
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abortion.207 However, once the national legislator has adopted laws that permit abortion, the 
doctrine on effective enjoyment of the rights is activated. The doctrine entails the access must 
not be illusory. The state must structure the procedures so that women can enjoy the right as 
adopted.208 Accordingly, the ECtHR has declared that criminal provisions on abortion may 
cause a chilling effect on doctors when they are to decide if the requirements of legal abortion 
are met in a given case. Thus, a state allowing induced abortion – even if only when the 
expectant mother’s life is at risk – must take the potential chilling effect into account and set 
up a framework that does not limit the possibilities for women to obtain lawful abortion.209  
In the context of abortions across borders, the authority Open Door and Dublin Well Woman 
v. Ireland210 is relevant. Irish consulting bureaus for women had been banned from providing 
counselling that could include information on abortion clinics abroad.211 The injunction from 
the Irish Supreme Court perpetually restrained the consulting bureaus from providing such 
information. The ECtHR found the injunction to violate freedom of expression, protected by 
Article 10. For certain, the injunction had pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of 
morals.212 The consulting bureaus had only provided women with an explanation on the 
available options. This, taken together with the absolute nature of the injunction, the 
availability of such information elsewhere, and the potential adverse risks for women not 
sufficiently resourceful to find such alternative sources of information, rendered the 
injunction disproportionate.213 Another interesting matter was touched upon in relation to 
Ireland in this case. According to  subsequent development after the injunction in Ireland, the 
Irish Supreme Court had clarified that the Irish Constitution empowered courts, when 
necessary, to restrain a pregnant woman from leaving the jurisidiction, in the name of the 
unborn.214  
 
Noteworthy, the PACE215 Resolution 1607 (2008) Access to safe and legal abortion in 
Europe, originates in a motion presented with a Swedish representative in front.216 PACE has 
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no mandate to pass binding laws.217 Nevertheless, the PACE resolutions reflect the current 
debates and topics within the states of Council of Europe.218 By majority – 109 votes in 
favour, 69 against, and 14 in abstention – Resolution 1607 (2008) was passed.219 The 
resolution invited states to decriminalise abortion within reasonable gestational limits if so 
had not been done and to guarantee the effective enjoyment of the right to safe and legal 
abortion. Moreover, the well-known conclusion that criminalisation of abortion does not 
decrease the practice, but leads to clandestine abortions, was underlined in the resolution.220 
Doctors unwilling to carry out abortion were listed as an impediment to access to legal 
abortion.221 In addition, the report that preceded the resolution established that the ultimate 
aim was to avoid as many abortions as possible.222  
 
Conclusively, at the material time of the Poland affair, the ECtHR was not the renowned 
protector of human rights as it is today.223 It remains the ECtHR’s argument that the existence 
of a right to abortion depends on the national laws. As for Sweden, the 1975 Abortion Act 
gives every woman seeking an abortion at a clinic in Sweden the right to one, save for women 
who wants abortion after pregnancy week no. 18, where the request is subject to a specific 
examination. The Swedish law confers a right that gives rise to a positive obligation for 
Sweden to provide an effective enjoyment of the right under the ECHR. Noteworthy, national 
abortion laws tend to reflect the role of religion in a society. The 1975 Abortion Act is, in 
comparison to other national laws, particularly liberal – originating in the, during the last 
decades, increased promotion of integrity in relation to society.224  
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4 The Section on Freedom of Conscience 
4.1 Freedom of Religion and Conscience in Sweden 
4.1.1 History of the Protection 
In an attempt to recite and understand religion in a Swedish context, one must know that 
Sweden has a long tradition of Christianity. In the 11th century, the first Christian king ruled. 
With the introduction of Christianity, the canon law followed.225 Along with the 16th century 
came the reformation and at the end of the century, the Lutheran faith had won definitive 
approval as the religion of the Swedish nation.226 In the first Instrument of Government, 1634, 
the doctrine of unity between the state and the Church of Sweden was fortified; total unity in 
religion was pursued.227 The first development to border on the notion of freedom of religion 
began in the 18th century, where immigrants were guaranteed a narrow version of the 
freedom. In the Instrument of the Government of 1809, Article 16 enshrined the freedom. The 
rule stated that the King were not to force the conscience of anyone, but to protect free 
religious exercise, save for under circumstances when the religious exercise disturbed the 
peace of society or provoked annoyance amongst the public. However, this did not change the 
duty to profess the Evangelic-Lutheran faith, but conferred a freedom to exercise the religion 
as one pleased.228 To fall off from the pure evangelism was criminal until 1860.229 Religious 
matters were decided upon in the Riksdag until 1866. The Riksdag was at the time divided 
into representative sections, thereamong a priest section, until it was abolished with the 
reform in 1866.230 Both freedom of religion and the separation between the Church of Sweden 
and the state was subject to considerable debate in the 19th and 20th centuries. In 1952, 
religionsfrihetslagen (1951:680) – the Freedom of Religion Act – entered into force and 
fortified both the positive and the negative aspects of the freedom. A similar writing as the 
one in 1809’s Instrument of Government qualified the positive aspects of the freedom: 
limitations were allowed when the religious exercise disturbed the peace of society or 
provoked annoyance amongst the public.231 Worthy of repetition, 1952 was also the year in 
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which Sweden ratified the ECHR.232 Nevertheless, the Church of Sweden remained in close 
unity with the state.233 After close consideration and a number of investigations, the Riksdag 
historically decided, December 1995, on the separation between the Church of Sweden and 
the state.234 In 2000, the separation was executed.235 As seen, Sweden has a long tradition of 
Christian values. Due to the close relationship and the dominance of Christianity, the religious 
doctrine has had a notable impact on many areas of law, even though unity in religion is no 
longer an aim of the Swedish state. 
4.1.2 The Constitutional Protection 
In the judgment E.G v. Region Jönköpings län, the Swedish Labour Court found that the 
midwife’s conscience could not be separated from her religious conviction.236 Thus,  freedom 
of religion governs the question. In addition, Kavot Zillén has come to similar conclusions. 
Freedom of conscience is not explicitly protected – as it has been historically in the Swedish 
constitution – whereby the protection falls under freedom of religion. Zillén has also 
concluded that there exists no absolute right to conscientious objection.237 Noteworthy, these 
findings find a linguistic support in two dictionaries, presented by Mats Aldén in his 
dissertation from 2002.238 A dictionary from 1996 described freedom of conscience as 
especially the right to hold religious opinions; the other – from 1965 –  described it as the 
right for citizens to follow the religious conviction in religious matters, and profess any 
religion.239 
 
The protection is laid down in the Instrument of Government240 where in Chapter 2 Article 1 
paragraph 1 no. 6 the positive aspects are protected; the right to religion. Freedom of religion 
is listed among other freedoms of opinion in the Instrument of Government. The negative 
aspect – the right to stand outside and not take part in religion – is set forth in Chapter 2 
Article 2 of the Instrument of Government. The black letter of the law provides no possibility 
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to limit the freedom of religion, as exists for the other freedoms of opinion.241 However, this 
in theory absolute protection does not reflect reality, according to findings by Victoria 
Enkvist.242 Enkvist has problematised the confused standpoint on freedom of religion in 
Swedish law and has found that limitations are allowed in relation to freedom of religion – 
save for matters belonging to the core of the right. Enkvist has pointed to a statement in the 
preparatory works that emphasised the following: Any exercise of freedom of religion that 
flows from another right or freedom is to be governed by the rules of that right, not freedom 
of religion. The interpretation of what exercise of religion is crucial when trying to understand 
the ambit of protection of freedom religion. A broad interpretation entails a broad scope of 
protection.243  
 
The conclusion that limitations are allowed corresponds to jurisprudence as well as the ECHR 
– even though the ECHR does set a minimum level and allows for higher protection in 
national law – as the rights of others may be affected. Back to what exercise of religion is, this 
will, according to Enkvist’s interpretation, be decisive on the matter of limitations. According 
to a scheme by Enkvist first, the phenomenon must be examined as to whether the practice is 
religious or originates in culture or tradition. If the practice comes within the latter, it does not 
enjoy protection under freedom of religion. Moving on, if the phenomenon does not amount 
to religious exercise, the phenomenon will be excluded; if it constitutes religious exercise yet 
emanates from another freedom of opinion, limitations can be justified. When the exercise is 
not an extension of another opinion freedom, limitations are prohibited and the protection 
afforded is absolute.244 For example, in the case of pastor Åke Green, where the pastor had 
made statements on homosexuals during preachment, the Swedish Supreme Court held that it 
was apparent the pastor could not be freed from charges by invoking freedom of religion.245 A 
limitation must pursue a legitimate aim, an aim that pertain a democratic society; the 
limitation must be necessary to the aim pursued.246 The relevant rules on restriction are set 
forth in the Instrument of Government, Chapter 2 Articles 20, 21 and 23.  
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With the intent to facilitate understanding of this irregularity, and what values build the 
freedom, follows a passage on the more immediate history of the law and commentaries 
during its preparation. Explained supra, freedom of religion was earlier subject to relative 
protection. Before the new Instrument of Government saw daylight, a number of 
investigations were commissioned to prepare a new constitution, and its bill of rights.247 Early 
in the process, in the 1960’s, the importance of fortification of time-honoured traditions was 
underlined; strong protection of religious freedom was such a tradition.248 As the question on 
rights and freedoms was prepared further, the importance of democracy and universal suffrage 
in order to realise the rights was emphasised.249 The investigation submitted in 1973, that 
served basis for the new Instrument of Government, did not pay much attention to the bill of 
rights. Nevertheless, it was concluded that protection of the rights and freedoms had to be 
clear and precise – and limitations had to be possible. Freedom of religion was not allowed to 
disturb peace in society or offend the public; this self-written prohibition was not to be 
considered a limitation of the freedom.250 The first proposal was shaped as follows: “Unless 
otherwise prescribed by law, a Swedish citizens shall have […] the freedom to join with other 
individuals in religious communities and exercise his or her religion”251.252 
 
The new Instrument of Government entered into force with a slightly different wording than 
proposed as for freedom of religion.253 Due to the limped background to the rights catalogue, 
a new investigation was commissioned.254 In brief, this investigation resulted in the finding 
that rights and freedoms bring with them an austerity on the public authorities. Therefore, 
rights and freedoms had to be chiselled out with great prudence as they could otherwise 
endanger crucial interests of the vital democracy in Sweden.255 Limitations were to be 
allowed as to make possible social reforms and the strengthening of vital social interests.256 
The existence of a rights catalogue was not allowed to impede ordinary legislation, legislation 
that formed the basis for democratic development and the strife for social and economical 
reforms.257 Furthermore, the principle of majority – vital to the Swedish democratic order – 
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could not be compromised. Deviation from the principle of majority could only be 
permissible when necessary to the proliferation of the democratic system itself and values 
intrinsically linked with the spirit of democracy.258 The purpose of the rights catalogue was 
principally, in times of crisis, to protect the fundamental democratic values from outer force 
and anti-democratic views.259 In addition, it was clarified that religious expressions fell under 
freedom of expression; the same was true for freedom of assembly and association in relation 
to religion.260 The parts of freedom of religion which were not flowing from the other 
freedoms of opinion could not be subject to limitation. As all the other freedoms of opinion 
could be limited, the intention of the legislator can be interpreted as conferring absolute 
protection to the inner core of the freedom. Nevertheless, what comprised the inner core was 
not clarified.261 Conclusively, the preparatory works contribute to a quite shattered picture of 
the intentions and values. The importance of democracy and respect for social reforms was 
fundamental and freedom of religion could not be limited – yet, it was not allowed to impede 
ordinary legislation. In addition, restriction on some religious acts were not even considered 
to constitute a restriction. 
 
There exist different opinions among legal scholars in Sweden on the matter. A possible 
conclusion regarding the inner core and the relationship to other opinion rights would be that 
it is only what is termed forum internum that enjoys protection under the Instrument of 
Government – however, this is an interpretation that contradicts the explicit text of the 
freedom that refers to the exercise of religion. Some prominent Swedish jurists have argued 
that the Instrument of Government confers a protection against the banning or disfavouring of 
a religion. A similar interpretation stressed that the protection encompasses persecution 
without legitimate purposes, whilst another has held the protection to cover the forum 
internum and religious exercise that complies with laws and values of importance to society – 
such as equality between the sexes. Other interpretations hold that the most important parts – 
the religious assemblies and worship in community with others – can be limited.262 In 
addition to this, all these interpretations by distinguished jurists are narrow as to the width of 
the freedom. This might imply a common trend in the legal culture. However, the legislator 
intended to bestow a particular – yet undefined – part absolute protection. 
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Turning to the question on state neutrality, first, as the bill of rights was created, the Church 
of Sweden still held a privileged position in relation to the state. This special relationship did 
however not constitute a limitation to freedom of religion.263 Consequently, freedom of 
religion was created during a time when Sweden in fact was not neutral in the sphere of 
religion.264 Second, the neutral position Sweden aims to take in relation to religion, confirms 
in itself that religion is a question of the individual conscience – a question that belongs to the 
private sphere. Third, it is incumbent upon the state to express democratic values; this shall be 
compared to that the state historically were to express Christian values.265 Indeed, many 
ethical values, on which the state has built its laws, can be incompatible with ethics of 
religious groups. Veritably, absolute neutrality has been deemed not possible: the Swedish 
system is built on a set of fundamental ethical values. These values are said to originate in a 
humanism influenced principally by Christian ethics, but also other ideals such as non-
religious values.266 The description does not paint a picture of a fully neutral state. Rather, as 
a quote incorporated in an investigation on democracy in Sweden expressed: society will 
never be able to realise the idea of laws free from values; this is visible in its most extreme 
form during times when laws are cleared of morals, as even during those times, some values 
are given priority.267 
 
4.2 The Freedom of Conscience under the ECHR 
The freedom of thought, conscience, and religion is afforded protection under Article 9 of the 
ECHR. In general, freedom of religion is considered to be primarily a matter of individual 
conscience.268 A phrase constantly reiterated in connection to freedom of religion is that 
pluralism and tolerance is of paramount importance in a democracy.269 The repeating of the 
maxim is understandable in light of the history behind the ECHR. The ECHR was created as 
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an alarm bell, to protect against the rise of totalitarian regimes and to impede any gradual 
dismantling of individual freedom.270 In addition, ECHR is alleged to be a secular instrument, 
particularly so as secularism is considered to pair well with its the core values.271 Turning 
back to the freedom of religion, it consists of inner aspects: the freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion, and the right to change beliefs; it also comprises of an external 
aspect: the freedom to manifest beliefs.272 These aspects are oftentimes sorted into two 
categories where the inner aspects qualify as the forum internum whereas the freedom to 
manifest religion or belief qualifies as the forum externum.273 Only the forum externum – the 
manifestation – can be subject to limitations, as set forth and governed by Article 9 § 2. 
Hence, the protection of the forum internum is absolute whereas the forum externum enjoys a 
relative protection. Only four forms of manifestation – worship, teaching, practice, and 
observance – come within the scope of the ECHR. Not every act motivated or inspired by the 
religion is afforded protection by Article 9. Thus, in order for a specific act to qualify as a 
manifestation, a sufficiently close and direct nexus between the belief and the act is 
required.274 In this, the state shall be the neutral organiser of the exercise of various religions. 
To execute this role properly, the state must ensure the fair and proper treatment of minorities. 
However, Article 9 does not guarantee in every situation the right to behave as required by 
one’s faith; there exists no right for an individual who acts in accordance with his or her 
beliefs the right to disregard justified rules.275 Moreover, the relationship between a state and 
religion will depend on the specific domestic context; no uniformity as to what a state’s 
neutral position must be shaped as can be discerned.276 Noteworthy, the ECtHR has agreed on 
that some religious symbols are difficult to reconcile with inter alia the message of equality, 
that constitutes a fundamental aspect of a democratic society.277 In addition, the freedom has a 
negative aspect. For example, proselytising that amounts to an exertion of “improper pressure 
on people in distress or in need”278 is not compatible with the constant presence of the need to 
respect the inner freedom of others.279 
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As the case of Ellinor Grimmark concerns a potential breach, and the interest that is afforded 
primacy by a state is best reflected when there is a conflict, the test carried out under Article 9 
is here explained in brief. It is worth to mention that being an employee does not deprive the 
individual the enjoyment of the ECHR rights – Article 1 declares the protection to stretch for 
everyone within the jurisdiction of a state.280 The most relevant part of the test is carried out 
as it has been found that Article 9 is affected, that there exists a sufficient nexus and that the 
measure is prescribed by law. The criterion prescribed by law implies requirements as to the 
restriction’s descent and form – established in accordance with the national legal order – as 
well as its quality. The criterion embodies the notion of the rule of law.281 Further, the 
limitation must serve a legitimate aim.282 In assessing the circumstances in casu, the 
paramount importance is oftentimes granted the test of necessity in a democratic society.283 
Thereafter follows the necessary in a democratic society test: whether the measure was 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. In this, a fair balance shall be struck between the 
individual and the community as a whole; here, the margin of appreciation can be decisive.284  
 
William Schabas summarises the ECHR’s relation to religion and employment by stressing 
that the contractual obligations often serve to justify measures taken against an employee in 
this context. Schabas observes that the basis is not the religious belief but the contract and 
being an employee.285 For example, the ECtHR has found a requirement for a registrar to 
register all couples, including homosexual couples, as refused by a Christian applicant, to be 
justified; also, a limitation that required individuals to remove any ornament – including such 
religious symbols – that could risks the clinical safety at a health institution, has been 
evaluated and accepted under the ECHR.286 In a decision by the former European 
Commission of Human Rights, it was concluded that a civil servant’s possibility to relinquish 
a post is the ultimate guarantee of the freedom.287 However, in Kalac v. Turkey, in the context 
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of an employee who had expressed fundamentalist opinions not compatible with his work as a 
military judge, the ECtHR stated that “an individual may need to take his specific situation 
into account”288 in the manifestation. In later development concerning employees and 
religion, the ECtHR has held the argument on the possibility of changing job to be less 
appropriate; freedom of religion is vital to a democratic society whereby assessing the 
proportionality of the interference is more appropriate for a democratic state.289 Thus, this 
argument, frequent in the Ellinor Grimmark debate, will probably not persuade the ECtHR. 
 
As to cases related to conscience, conscientious objection to military service – both with 
ethical and religious basis – falls within the ambit of Article 9; criminalisation of 
conscientious objection to military service amounts to a violation of Article 9 § 2. At the time 
when this was established, in 2011, a striking European consensus on the right to such 
objection had developed; this was also reflected in international instruments. To deviate from 
such a standard, a state must show that the deviating measure corresponds to a pressing social 
need.290 Here, the ECtHR followed the modern opinion, as reflected in national laws, in a 
morally sensitive issue. Needless to say, it is difficult to compare conscientious objection to 
military service with that of conscientious objection to abortion; applying for a job as a 
midwife is voluntary – military service is oftentimes compulsory and often imposed on an 
individual based on the simple fact that the individual is born male. 
 
In Pichon and Sajous v. France291, the owners of a pharmacy could not enjoy the protection 
under Article 9 for the purpose of refusing to sell contraceptive pills. Noteworthy, the French 
Court of Cassation had held that as pharmacists have the exclusive right to sell medicines, 
personal conviction could not be invoked. It was added that “as long as the sale of 
contraceptives is legal and occurs nowhere other than in a pharmacy”292, precedence could not 
be given the religious beliefs of the applicants.293 Additionally, it is established from the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence that the health service system must be organised so that – when it 
exists – conscientious objection does not obstruct the patient’s effective enjoyment of his or 
her right as guaranteed by the applicable legislation.294 The ECtHR has not dealt with 
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conscientious objection separately, but has interpreted conscientious objection as a 
manifestation of religion. May it be that this is based on the intimate relationship between the 
objection and a religion in the cases that have appeared before the ECtHR; nevertheless, 
freedom of conscience per se only affords an absolute protection to the inner aspects, the 
mind of the individual.295  
 
In the context, the European Social Charter shall be mentioned in brief, which inter alia 
guarantees the right to health. Being a Council of Europe treaty, the ECtHR can take the 
European Social Charter into account. Moreover, the European Social Charter has its own 
compliance mechanism, the European Committee of Social Rights, before which cases on 
abortion and conscientious objection have been heard: The Catholic organisation FAFCE 
claimed the right to health had been breached as Sweden had failed to minimise the number of 
abortions –  a conscientious objection clause had to be introduced. The Committee held that 
the right to health does not give rise to a positive obligation for states to introduce such a 
clause. In a case regarding Italy, the Committee has clarified that the impediment which 
conscientious objection constitutes to real access to abortion for women in Italy must be 
eliminated.296 In 2010, PACE passed Resolution 1763 (2010) on the right to conscientious 
objection in lawful medical care. It invited the states to develop regulations affirming the right 
to conscientious objection with regard to health and medical care, specifically targeting 
abortion. However, it originated in a motion for a resolution that stressed the issues stemming 
from unregulated use of conscientious objection as a practice that could have severe 
consequences for women’s access to health care. The motion expressed concerns as to the 
arise of conscientious objection.297 However, religious groups from, among others, Poland 
and Italy, protested and managed to change the purpose of the resolution. Instead, the right to 
conscientiously object to perform abortion was emphasised.298 In order to meet the obligation 
to ensure access to lawful medical care, the duty to refer the patient to another health care 
provider was emphasised. A right for hospitals and institutions to refuse the practice of 
abortion was included.299 The resolution was adopted with small majority – 56 in favour, 51 
against. However, the resolution can be said to mirror a form of consensus in the Council of 
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Europe. Later, Resolution 1928 (2013) was adopted, that reaffirmed the need to respect 
conscientious objection by health care personnel.300 Moreover, PACE Resolution 2036 (2015) 
Tackling intolerance and discrimination in Europe with a special focus on Christians contains 
a clause, 6.2.2, where the states were urged to uphold freedom of conscience in the workplace 
while maintaining access to services provided by law.301 
 
4.3 The Debate on Ellinor Grimmark’s Conscience 
4.3.1 Contextualisation 
In the debate of freedom of conscience, a particular statement in the preparatory works made 
by the Minister of Justice tends to be invoked. First, the 1975 Abortion Act only confers to 
doctors the right to ordinate abortion. In the preparatory works, it was stated that doctors are 
under a duty to make proper and right decisions – id est, to respect the woman’s wish.302 The 
health care personnel’s duty to take part in abortion was sorted under the category questions 
of medical and administrative nature.303 Second, a number of consultation bodies had 
emphasised the importance to respect the wish of personnel refusing to participate in abortion 
procedures. The Minister of Justice agreed that in organising the work, one should avoid the 
tying of such personnel to abortion work; such wishes were to be respected to the greatest 
extent possible. This was to be solved in the same way such questions were solved in the 
labour market in general. However, the principal interest that governed this statement was the 
interest of the abortion-seeking woman. It was found unnecessary to regulate conscientious 
objection to abortion.304 Noteworthy, in an investigation on the subject of students’ possible 
right to conscientious objection, it has been emphasised that exercise of religion cannot be 
admitted if it has impact on patient safety. Therefore, no clause on conscientious objection 
was introduced in that field.305 Moreover, a motion from 1976 proposed that the new law had 
to be overruled by reference to the Christian values upon which the Swedish society is built. 
Abortion constituted a breach of Christian principles of right; the new law was that of a 
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dictatorship – save for cases when the mother’s life was at risk.306 The motion was inspired by 
a statement of JO in 1975, wherein the statement of the Minister of Justice and conscientious 
objection was brought up. JO had dealt with an errand of two doctors’ conscientious objection 
to perform abortion. The doctors had not been granted the right to object. The Medical 
Association argued for the introduction of a clause on the right to conscientious objection. 
However, JO found the statement by the Minister of Justice to constitute an opening for local 
administration: If possible, conscientious objection could be allowed. Yet, JO held that the 
statement by the Minister of Justice was not categorical with regard to the allowance of 
conscientious objection to abortion.307  
4.3.2 Procedure and Judgment of the Swedish Labour Court 
Ellinor Grimmark reported the County of Jönköping Region (hereafter the Region) to DO, the 
Equality Ombudsman, and contended she had been discriminated by the Region. DO closed 
the matter by concluding that there had been no discrimination. DO found the criteria laid 
down by the Region – that a midwife must be able to participate in work at all departments of 
the clinic – necessary and proportional to secure the rights of abortion-seeking women. Thus, 
the interference with Grimmark’s freedom of religion was justified.308  
 
Ellinor Grimmark thereafter filed a claim before the District Court of Jönköping. The District 
Court found the measures by the Region had not amounted to discrimination, and she 
appealed to the Labour Court. On 12th April 2017 the Labour Court delivered the judgment. 
The same conclusions were found as those in the appealed verdict. The primary object of the 
dispute concerns damages as to aspects of labour law, Article 9 and 10 of the ECHR and 
discrimination thereto. The prohibition of discrimination is to be found in Article 14 of the 
ECHR. The Labour Court interpreted Swedish law in conformity with the ECHR.309 
 
Grimmark invoked her rights enshrined in the ECHR310 and held that the repeated treatment 
the Swedish hospitals – where she, at each respective women’s clinic, had applied for a 
position as a midwife – had subjected her to amounted to a breach of her ECHR rights. 
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Grimmark had, as she applied for the positions, informed each potential employer of her 
incapacity to perform abortion, assist thereto (save for exempli gratia giving the woman a 
glass of water post operation), insert IUDs and prescribe morning after pills.311 All positions 
were as a civil servant, id est public employment. Grimmark alleged refusal to offer her an 
employment312 amounted to discrimination, especially when taking into account the acute 
shortage in health care professionals and her professional competence. The refusals had been 
discriminatory in nature since they were based on her conscience and beliefs. Grimmark 
asserted there was a difference between conscientious objection and the manifestation of 
religious beliefs – conscientious objection enjoyed absolute protection. Moreover, the 1975 
Abortion Act Article 5 only conferred upon doctors the right and obligation to perform 
abortion. She further emphasised the existence of a near total European consensus in 
accepting the conscientious objection to abortion, where Sweden remains one of the few 
states refusing to introduce a conscientious objection clause. This consensus leaves Sweden a 
narrow margin of appreciation. Moreover, she held the measures and the criteria by the 
Region not necessary as her objection would not affect the practical and principal access to 
abortion. Hence, the Region should organise the work in order to fit her conscientious 
objection, especially so as some other midwives at Swedish public hospitals enjoyed this 
right.313   
The Region challenged Grimmark’s arguments. The Region held the decisions were based on 
organisational needs, as every employee had to serve at all departments. The said need 
originated in the duty of the Region to provide abortions. Through this, the Region put the 
abortion-seeking woman first. The Region agreed that only doctors were entitled to prescribe 
abortion. However, midwives could be delegated the task to prepare and give abortifacients; 
the right to delegate and structure work appertain to the managerial prerogative. The Region 
highlighted the progress and emphasised custom developed in the recent years, whereby 
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medical abortion – by the intake of abortifacients – dominates nowadays, in contrast to the 
practice in 1975, when surgical abortion dominated.314  
The Labour Court found the conscientious objection by Grimmark to fall within the ambit of 
Article 9 ECHR; her posture to refuse to take part in the performing of abortion, manifested as 
refusal of work, amounted to an exercise of religion in the sense of Article 9 ECHR.315 The 
Labour Court did not specify closer whether the objection fell under freedom of conscience or 
freedom of religion – Grimmark’s objection was based in both, the two of them being 
inseparable.316 The Labour Court found that the decisions not to offer her employment had not 
been based on her religious belief, but rather her expressed unwillingness to perform certain 
work – however emanating from her belief – as required by each position. Thus, the measures 
did not amount to a breach of Article 9 § 1 or constitute direct discrimination.317 
Furthermore, the decisions did not constitute prohibited indirect discrimination; the criterion 
set forth by the Region was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.318 In brief, the 
criterion was found to be prescribed by law. The Labour Court agreed with the Region and 
found support in instructions set by the National Board of Health and Welfare. The 
instructions entitle midwives to prepare and administer medicine – thereby, to provide 
abortion-seeking women with abortifacients, even if the entitlement to prescribe the medicine 
comes within the doctor’s specific mandate. Moreover, the measure found support in the 
managerial prerogative and the Health and Medical Services Act with its provisions on good 
care. As the contested criteria appeared neutral but could put persons who professed a specific 
faith in disfavour, the Labour Court examined whether the decisions had pursued a legitimate 
aim and if so, a fair balance had been struck between the competing interests.319 The Labour 
Court found that the measure served a legitimate aim, namely, the rights and interests of 
women (to obtain abortion). Noteworthy, the Region had alleged that the protection of 
interests of other employees and the public was an additional aim.320 Conclusively, the 
Region’s approach enforced the regulations on abortion, regulations issued in accordance with 
the democratic procedure set forth in the Swedish Constitution. The Region – in the capacity 
of a care giver – is obligated to provide abortion, which entails that Sweden may violate its 
                                                
314 E.G. v. Region Jönköpings län, p. 13–14. 
315 E.G. v. Region Jönköpings län, p. 10–11. 
316 E.G. v. Region Jönköpings län, p. 11.  
317 E.G. v. Region Jönköpings län, p. 12. 
318 E.G. v. Region Jönköpings län, p. 17. 
319 E.G. v. Region Jönköpings län, p. 14. 
320 E.G. v. Region Jönköpings län, p. 12–17. 
 65 
obligations under the ECHR if the right to abortion is not effectively enjoyed. In addition, the 
frequency of medical abortion has increased among the abortion methods.321 Due to its nature, 
a non-performed abortion does not render itself feasible for repair in retroactivity. A wait too 
long can entail unrepairable aftermaths. According to Swedish law, the patient is in focus. 
With this established, the criterion laid down by the Region was both necessary and 
proportional to the legitimate aim pursued.  
Another part of Grimmark’s claim was that the Region had violated her freedom of 
expression, protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. Grimmark contended that one of the 
decisions not to employ her had been based in a statement made by her in a local newspaper, 
on the subject of abortion. Thus, her opinion per se comprised a part of the Region’s decision 
material. Moreover, patients would not be affected by her posture; her opinion on abortion 
would not be expressed at the hospital. Therefore, her freedom of expression had been 
violated by the Region. The Labour Court did not agree with Ellinor Grimmark and found no 
violation. Her incapacity to perform parts of the job had constituted the fundament of the 
Region’s decisions. That her incapacity to perform abortion and other tasks also had come to 
the Region’s knowledge through Ellinor Grimmark’s statement in the local newspaper did not 
render any change in the earlier finding.322 In addition, presentation of evidence took place 
under the hearing in the District Court, where interrogations were held. A number of 
interrogations were held with managers at the clinics involved. During one questioning, a 
manager explained that after having read the local newspaper she had realised Grimmark was 
an active opponent to abortion; Grimmark’s posture and reputation as an opponent could hurt 
the clinic’s reputation and risk the clincial safety.323 One manager denied whilst interrogated 
the assertion made by Grimmark that she had ever questioned whether one even could 
become a midwife with an abortion approach like Ellinor Grimmark’s; another had allegedly 
stated people like Ellinor Grimmark did not belong at a women’s clinic.324 While interrogated, 
yet another manager confirmed it was her firm belief that one could not work at a women’s 
clinic if one did not hold a positive attitude to abortion.325 
Ellinor Grimmark is not alone in claiming a right to conscientious objection. In late 2016, 
another midwife-to-be lost in a similar case. The same construction as was applied in relation 
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to Ellinor Grimmark, was applied to this midwife, Linda Steen – the criterion that all 
midwives had to participate in tasks at all parts of the clinic, did not violate freedom of 
religion. Noteworthy, the fact that Linda Steen had not applied to the position under any form 
of coercion, also justified the interference.326 Linda Steen’s counterpart argued that a woman 
who wanted an abortion should be sure to only meet personnel showing empathy for her 
situation.327 Alike Ellinor Grimmark, Linda Steen now works in Norway, where conscientious 
objection is permitted.328  
4.3.3 The General Debate  
Media has covered the case of Ellinor Grimmark. Among the debaters, two strands are visible 
–  the ones who claim the individual right of Ellinor Grimmark must prevail, and, in addition, 
that this would not affect the right to abortion, as conscientious objection and the right to 
abortion are two separate entities. By not recognising conscientious objection, Sweden comes 
across as a closed and intolerant society.329 This strand finds support in statements by 
professor emeritus Reinhold Fahlbeck, whose argument is that the preparatory works to the 
1975 Abortion Act comprises a conscience clause, whereby the right to conscientious 
objection already exists in Sweden.330 In addition, Grimmark has held that other midwives 
have asked her to proceed with her claim, as conscientious objection is necessary in 
Sweden.331 Three doctors, fellows at Claphaminstitutet – an ecumenical think tank – argued 
that Resolution 1763 must be respected and incorporated in Sweden. Noteworthy, the doctors 
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also made reference to an earlier discussed register on persons invoking conscientious 
objection in a comparison to practices of totalitarian dictatorship.332 One argument related to 
the conscientious objection debate holds that diversity as to belief and conviction among 
health care personnel may have a positive impact as this reflects the diversity among 
patients.333 
 
The other school invokes potential effects on access to abortion and difficulties for employers 
in organising the work; it tends to interpret Ellinor Grimmark’s claim as an attack on the 1975 
Abortion Act.334 This strand holds abortion to be a self-written part of midwifery – like any 
other employee, a midwife must perform all relevant tasks and put aside personal opinions.335 
Representatives from Sex and Politics in Norway and the Swedish Association for Sexuality 
Education claim that Norway struggles with the right to conscientious objection.336 
Representatives and presidents of prominent associations in the care giver field, as the 
Swedish Medical Association, Swedish Association of Midwifes, the Swedish Association of 
Local Authorities and Regions et alia have expressed in an united opinion that the right to 
abortion would be threatened by the mere existence of a right to conscientious objection – 
Swedish health care is about putting the patient first. Moreover, the representatives argued – 
as many other – that to be a midwife is no human right.337 The vice-chairman of the Swedish 
Association of Health Professionals has expressed worry as to a potential dispute before the 
ECtHR, as there is a risk that ECtHR would interpret the case contrary to Swedish 
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standards.338 A professor in political science presented an interpretation in which he stressed 
that civil servants must obey by the law and put aside individual convictions. Moreover, the 
freedom of religion is a protection afforded the individual vis-à-vis the public, not when one is 
the public – a midwife working at a public health care facility is the public in exercising the 
power of a public employment. As the state is secular, it befits civil servants to show 
secularity in relation to patients.339 One observant debater noted that Sweden stands out as 
extremely secular in surveys on religion.340  
 
After she had lost in the Labour Court, Grimmark stated that she will proceed and file an 
application before the ECtHR.341 In addition, the American organisation ADF, with a clear 
anti-abortion agenda, has been said to fund Ellinor Grimmark’s trial costs.342 An opinion by 
the ADF was submitted to DO.343 However, that Ellinor Grimmark’s case is part of a purpose 
to undermine the 1975 Abortion Act has been denied by both ADF and Ellinor Grimmark.344  
 
In the wake of Resolution 1763, presented supra, a debate was held on conscientious 
objection in the Riksdag. On 11th May 2011, a decision was taken not to introduce a clause on 
a right to conscientious objection to abortion, inter alia as the legitimacy of the resolution was 
questioned. Both the special position Sweden holds in relation to reproductive health as well 
as the potential consequences on access to abortion were emphasised.345 Noteworthy, the 
argument commonly seen in the debate on Ellinor Grimmark appeared: arguments against 
stressed that there is no right to work as a midwife, whilst there exists a fundamental human 
right for every person to decide over his or her own body. As for the voices in favour of a 
clause on conscientious objection, the need to separate the issue of abortion from the right to 
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conscientious objection was stressed, particularly so as the right to conscientious objection is 
a fundamental human right – derived from Resolution 1763 (2010).346 In 2012, Resolution 
1763 (2010) was referred to yet again. Similar arguments appeared: Health care personnel’s 
ethical dilemmas must be respected. This argument was paired with graphic stories from late 
abortions. On the contrary, no one is forced to work within the health care sector; no abortion-
seeking woman should be met by someone refusing to provide the relevant care. The health 
care cannot include such exceptions as the patient is and shall be in focus.347 In addition, 
motions arguing the introduction of a clause on the right to conscientious objection for health 
care personnel have been submitted frequently in the last years, by the right-winged 
nationalist party and the Christian party, represented in the Riksdag.348  
 
 
                                                
346 Riksdagens protokoll 2010/11:100, under no. 37–45, p. 38–45.  
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5 Analysis 
5.1 A Short Summary: What Has Been Presented? 
Before beginning with the proper analysis, a short reminder on what materials have been put 
forth and examined is required. We have seen that abortion pertained to the area of penal law 
for decades in Sweden. However, the existence of a collision of interest was first recognised 
by the general principle of law that repealed the reprehensibility of abortion when the 
woman’s life was at risk. Thus, to obtain an abortion during the said circumstances was not a 
criminal act. After decades of debate, the 1938 Abortion Act was finally introduced and 
comprised of three abortion indications: medical; eugenic; humanitarian. The preparation 
procedure of the new law was characterised by tensions between those who promoted the old 
morals and those who urged for social reforms. The 1938 Abortion Act claimed to protect the 
sanctity of life, sexual morals, and women from taking decisions against their nature. General 
prevention was important. The indications constituted exceptions to the principal rule on 
accountability for the criminal act of abortion.  
 
The 1938 Abortion Act remained in force with a few amendments in 1965; the sociomedical 
indication had finally been introduced; women were seldom prosecuted for the act of abortion 
due to Chapter 3 Article 11 of the Penal Code. With this legal framework in Sweden, Swedish 
women travelled to Poland to obtain abortions. The Prosecutor General recommended 
prosecution and held that Swedish morals had to be protected; the foetus came within the 
notion of Swedish interests, whereby it was possible to take legal proceedings against all the 
persons involved. Prosecution was called for in the name of general prevention. The 
Prosecutor General’s statement had an immediate aftermath in the debate. Organisations as 
well as individuals from all over the country engaged in the discussion. Many strongly 
disagreed with the official interpretation. Indignation was expressed as to the deviation from 
the standard to not prosecute a woman who had obtained an illegal abortion. Within a few 
days, the issue was linked to the question on the character of the 1938 Abortion Act. Two 
strands were visible. The more conservative opinion put forward arguments on the necessity 
to maintain the law, not give in to propaganda, and to preserve the sexual morals. The more 
progressive opinion heckled the conservative morals by presenting Sweden as a nanny state, 
and held that the Poland case made visible social injustice; therefore, the need for a 
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liberalisation and dechristianisation of the 1938 Abortion Act was displayed. A couple of days 
after the statement from the Prosecutor General had come, Kungl. Maj:t decided to use 
abolition for the purpose of waiving further legal proceedings. At the stroke of a pen, the 
women and Hans Nestius were freed from all allegations and could not be prosecuted. An 
investigation was commissioned, and in 1975, the new law entered into force, where the old 
morals had yielded before the new principal value: A woman’s right to decide over her own 
body. The 1975 Abortion Act also constitutes a right to abortion under the ECHR, within the 
ambit of Article 8. Nevertheless, this does not give rise to a general right to abortion under the 
ECHR, but only affects Sweden. Therefore, the current Polish, more restrictive legislation, is 
also viable under the ECHR. 
 
In the preparatory works to the 1975 Abortion Act, the Minister of Justice dealt with a 
question that had appeared during the preparation of the new law. The question concerned 
health care personnel whose conscience made it impossible for them to perform abortion. 
Requests from such personnel was to be respected to the greatest extent possible, like how the 
managerial prerogative was exercised in other areas of the labour market. In the now, Ellinor 
Grimmark is a midwife with such a conscience. In April 2017, she lost her case before the 
Swedish Labour Court; the Region in which she had sought and been denied employment had 
not discriminated against her. To require of a midwife to perform all tasks at a clinic, 
including abortion, was a justified practice that found basis in the protection of patients, and 
in particular, in the interests of abortion-seeking women. The basis for Ellinor Grimmark’s 
claim is that her conscientious objection comes within the sphere of protection of freedom of 
conscience, a freedom that does not exist independently in the Instrument of Government, but 
must be considered to fall under freedom of religion. Sweden, being a state party to the 
ECHR, shall interpret Swedish law in conformity with the ECHR. Therefore, both the 
provision on freedom of religion in the Instrument of Government and Article 9 in the ECHR 
are relevant in the case of Ellinor Grimmark. We have also seen that the Swedish 
Constitutional framework earlier had a strong relationship to the Church of Sweden and that, 
even though the general religious freedom has a stronger protection today, there seems to be a 
narrow room for religious exercise in the workplace. One possible answer to this is the 
legislator’s wish to not let religious exercise impede democratic development and social 
reforms. Or, the more secular approach by the state. Furthermore, the debate on Ellinor 
Grimmark’s conscience is dominated by two strands. One strand claims that the individual 
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right of Ellinor Grimmark must prevail, the other holds that access to abortion is at risk and 
that abortion is a natural part of midwifery. 
5.2 Studying the Two Debates: What Do They Unveil?  
To facilitate reading, each research question will be answered separately. Every paragraph 
begins with a reiteration of the research question to be answered. 
 
What values are enshrined within the relevant laws?  
 
It falls naturally to begin with the values protected by the 1938 Abortion Act, as this law was 
in force during the Poland case. The 1938 Abortion Act was a child of a quite tense debate 
between conservative and more liberal forces. The members of the investigations that 
preceded the legislative act watched the development in the field of sexuality and sexual 
morals with abhorrence. However, the factual social conditions required some sort of 
regulation. Indeed, people did not act in accordance with the morals the criminal provision 
aimed to preserve. A strong discrepancy existed between the deep structure of the law and the 
surface level of the law, as the morals to a large extent failed to gain a foothold in people’s 
actual conduct. Before the 1938 Abortion Act was enacted, the existing general principle of 
law recognised the root: It was all about a collision of interests. However, the law operated 
under the principal rule of abortion as a criminal and reprehensible act; society had the task to 
protect the unborn. Therefore, the legislator wished to preserve the values as expressed in the 
penal law provision. We here see that the surface level of the law asserted a right to decide on 
the matter, whilst women’s actions posed an immediate threat to that assertion. As the 
legislator could not accept that a woman should have the right to decide over her own body, 
social reforms had to be introduced to change such tendencies among women. In a way, the 
legislator tried to change the sediment so that it would match the values that the legislator 
wished to protect – so that the movements at the bottom level would not influence the higher 
levels of law any further. Nevertheless, the process had already been started. Indeed, the 
controversial sociomedical indication was not introduced at first, still, the question had been 
brought to the table. It is worth to note that the existence of the eugenic indication strongly 
contradicted the principle of the sanctity of life. The underpinning value then gradually lost its 
validity, and pointed to that the legislation also promoted other moral dictates: chastity, and a 
wish to govern both the woman and the nativity. Given the strong Christan tradition and the 
explicit referral to canon law as the source of the state duty to protect the unborn, the values 
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can be considered as religious. The law aimed at an ideal, an ideal imposed upon women 
through a penal provision. 
 
Now, the courts had practically ceased to prosecute women at the material time of the Poland 
case, and Chapter 3 Article 11 of the Penal Code stipulated special reasons were required in 
order to hold the woman accountable for the act of illegal abortion. A slow liberalisation – to 
a small extent – had come with the gradual relaxation through the amendments of the 1938 
Abortion Act. However, the nature of the legislation was the same as in 1938, when the 1938 
Abortion Act first was introduced. One may argue that the surface level of the law at the time 
was Janus-faced. There existed no coherence between the morals in the legislation and the 
application of the law. The courts for certain acted in accordance with Chapter 3 Article 11 of 
the Penal Code, yet, the 1938 Abortion Act enshrined completely different values. The law 
moved between two extremes, there existed a sort of inherent antagonism. Rightfully 
observed throughout the law-making process, the law was applied differently in different 
areas of Sweden. Conclusively, the law at the material time of the Poland case held on to the 
old morals, yet existed in a society that had begun to take another direction. 
 
The 1975 Abortion Act promotes the free will of women, stipulates a right to abortion, and 
obliges the state to guarantee access to abortion. Little regard is had to the old values – only 
after week 18, the unborn’s interests are given protection. The 1975 Abortion Act exists in a 
context that promotes equality and equity, a context that wishes to separate conservative 
morals from the public policy. Moreover, it is the values of the 1975 Abortion Act and the 
principle that the patient’s interests are to be put first that constitute the actual justification of 
the criterion that locks Ellinor Grimmark out of the relevant labour market. By looking at the 
materials gathered, it is clear that the woman’s right to abortion and her autonomy prevail. 
The law is secular and wishes not to impose a moral ideal, in contrast to its predecessor. 
Hospitals are obligated to secure the right to abortion, and from this duty spring a need to hire 
personnel willing to comply with instructions from the hospital management. This line of 
argumentation is reasonable as midwifery in Sweden presupposes participation in abortion 
procedures. This brings us to the next legislation to examine, namely the Instrument of 
Government.   
 
The Instrument of Government, despite its wording, does not protect freedom of religion in 
absolute terms. It appears as if only the forum internum is guaranteed absolute protection –  
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an interpretation in line with the ECHR approach. From the preparatory works, we learn that 
the exercise of religion cannot impede social reforms or undermine the majority principle. 
One may argue that this despatches religion to the private sphere. Moreover, the state shall 
mediate democratic values to its citizens – and many religious and other ethics are not 
compatible with such values. In the context, Sweden has deliberately contravened the 
invitation to introduce a clause on conscientious objection to abortion. Moreover, religious 
exercise that emanates from another right or freedom, or originates in culture or tradition, is 
not protected by freedom of religion. This yet again confirms that the legislation holds 
religious practices to be a private thing. Therefore, the Labour Court judgment is not exactly 
surprising – at work, especially when working as a civil servant, an individual shall comply 
with the management orders and laws, and express democratic values. Indeed, it would be 
difficult to suggest that the abortion issue does not pertain to women’s rights issues. 
Inevitably, the right to abortion is intimately linked to the questions on equality and equity. 
The Instrument of Government values religious freedom yet seems to give a certain priority to 
the majority opinion, as, exempli gratia, expressed in laws enacted by the Riksdag. Cautiously 
it can be suggested that the Swedish Constitution does not accord religion at a public 
workplace any particular value if opposed to an interest related to women’s rights, as 
promoted by Swedish law. The Swedish state encompasses secular values. This conclusion 
finds support in the fact that Sweden today claims to be a neutral state expressing democratic 
values, as compared to the earlier mission to express Christian values, and the long 
relationship with the Church of Sweden. Even though religion has had great impact on the 
Swedish system, those are not the values of the state anymore. Clearly, the secular and neutral 
posture of the state is reflected at all levels of the law. The narrow margin for religious 
exercise at the workplace can be argued to constitute a product of this approach, where the 
sediment level is reflected in the application of the law as well as the preparatory works. 
Moreover, the refusal to introduce a clause on conscientious objection to abortion is a product 
of the principles that permeates the entire abortion area today. Religion does not belong to this 
area, according to the current dominating opinion.  
 
The ECHR sets out to protect the rights of individuals as well as democracy. However, as to 
both abortion and exercise of religion at the workplace, it appears as if the ECHR values 
sovereignty and the national context. These questions are left to the margin of appreciation. 
Therefore, the ECHR gives room for diverse interpretations and in this, confirms that 
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religion’s status in a country is allowed to, and will, influence – however various they might 
be – the abortion related frameworks.  
 
What arguments dominated the two debates? Is it possible to discern any similarities? 
 
The materials of this thesis comprise, as is quite obvious, arguments from the two classical 
strands pro et contra abortion. Indeed, the basis for Ellinor Grimmark’s conscientious 
objection to abortion is the very same that once governed the entire area of abortion laws. 
Ingemar Hedenius’ critique in the Poland case pinpointed the issue; his critique makes the 
frictions appear clear: The Prosecutor General’s interpretation of the law – and the law itself – 
appertained to another kind of society. As for the Poland debate, the Church of Sweden’s 
historically strong position and the Christian doctrines’ vigorous impact on Swedish 
legislation was also challenged, although not explicitly.  
 
The Poland case debate was characterised by tension. First, the statements by the Prosecutor 
General – to preserve morals, to prosecute for the purposes of general prevention, and that the 
foetus was a Swedish interest – caused indignation. Debaters did not accept the persecution of 
already vulnerable persons and the use of the nationality principle to preserve a moral 
standard that the Penal Code and the Swedish courts no longer insisted on. Here, we see that 
the debaters, and thereafter Kungl. Maj:t and the legislator, took a stance for an expurgation 
where old morals and other remains of eras dominated by religion and population policy, were 
left behind. This grip is also one of the main features of legal positivism, the separation of law 
and morals. The same separation is reflected in the difficulty for debaters to accept the 
principle of nationality in context. For example, we have seen that Hans Nestius was 
convinced he had helped the women involved, in particular as the law aimed to protect 
women from charlatans. This is an interesting interpretation that of course must be seen in the 
light of his role and agenda. Still, the purpose of the 1938 Abortion Act inter alia was to 
protect women from taking decisions against a woman’s nature and to overcome issues with 
charlatans. One can therefore question the nature of Hans Nestius’ interpretation as the will to 
get at charlatan doctors rather seems to have been based on a will to uphold the morals and 
disable access to abortion based on women’s right to decide for themselves. The more 
conservative body held that the propaganda had influenced the authorities’ decision-making 
and later, the law. At some point, this speculation is reasonable. The rule of law must of 
course be conserved. However, this indicates democracy, as some debaters inferred. The old 
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law that inclined toward a patronising posture apparently seemed to have had less support 
within the public opinion. This leads to the finding that it was more legalistic to apply 
abolition – a constitutional, legal institute – to bring about a situation where a moral law, 
(however being positive law) that did not have support in the public opinion, was in principle 
annulled. In addition, this respects the principle of majority. With this in mind, we can see 
how a legal principle was used to bring about justification. The movements in the sediment 
level of law could reach the highest level of the law, and therefrom, the actions at the top level 
further justified what moved in the depths. 
 
We can see that both claims by the individual – Ellinor Grimmark, the Poland travellers – 
spring from a perception of the individual as central, a line of thought sanctioned and 
favoured by the ECHR and the human rights movement. Interestingly, in both events, we can 
identify the human rights argumentation: the focus on the individual in relation to the state. 
Similar to the debaters who mocked the interpretation that the foetus belonged to Sweden, and 
that its protection was a Swedish state interest, the core of this absurdity permeates the entire 
argumentation of Grimmark: as she deviates from a set norm, is her ways of thinking a 
property of the state? When this argument is put in contrast to the Poland case, it becomes 
clear that so is not. The 1938 Abortion Act was built on clear canons, canons that the state had 
earlier imposed upon its citizens – the jurisprudence, as seen, deviated from this standard. 
Nevertheless, the purpose to impose the morals therein was not obscured in the Prosecutor 
General’s statement. Indeed, this caused indignation and many voices in the opinion could not 
accept – or understand –  the application of the nationality principle. In addition, through the 
application of the nationality principle, the notion of owning probably became more visible 
for people in the debate; that the law reached for a woman’s body outside the Swedish 
territory shed light on the freedom aspects of the question.  
 
The two events separate when it comes to the relationship to the state. As a midwife in 
Sweden, one works on a mandate that springs from the state duty to provide health care. A 
pregnant woman in Sweden holds no duty to – as earlier manifested in law – give birth. An 
employment, is, of course, a contractual obligation. However, a contract can be varied in 
accordance with the conditions set up at the time when the agreement was entered. Therefore, 
this argument is in itself not compelling, as the employment contract can be adapted to the 
particular circumstances. The argument that the midwife should just change her job, seems 
insufficient and simplistic. A rejection so categorical seems to limp; it appears to shut out all 
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other perspective. Nevertheless, the resolute nature of this argument opens for another 
question to be posed: What constitutes the authority, the presupposed assertion behind it all? 
This will be further explicated under the next research question, yet, debaters touched upon 
this in that they assume abortion is considered a natural part of midwifery in Sweden today. 
Even so, those in favour of allowing conscientious objection to abortion – in line with the 
international recommendations – stressed that the right to abortion would remain respected; 
Ellinor Grimmark was not trying to alter the societal norms and did not participate in ADF’s 
lobby programme. Here, we see how their argumentation was circumscribed by the current 
judicial perception of abortion; they did not attempt to argue about the Ought, or to let morals 
re-enter the legal framework. This legalistic grip can also be identified in the Poland case. 
Good faith of the people involved was constantly argued and indeed, took part in the 
vindication of abolition. 
 
Both the Poland case and the case of Ellinor Grimmark seemed not to concern access to 
abortion de jure. The Poland case came to be about abortion, but the decisions concerned 
abolition and jurisdiction outside Swedish territory. Grimmark argued for her freedom of 
religion. However, as seen, debaters in both discussions subsequently drifted to what can be 
described as a de facto argumentation on access to abortion.  
 
The Ellinor Grimmark debate is divided between those who stress the need to maintain access 
to abortion and in this, claim that we must preserve the values enshrined in the 1975 Abortion 
Act, and those who hold that respect for freedom of religion must prevail, as the access to 
abortion will not be affected. To work as a midwife is no human right, insisted some debaters. 
The quality of this argument is of course questionable; it does not point to the key issue. 
Rather, it points us to another observation: The human rights talk is, however tentative, 
present in the Poland case debate, whilst it blossoms proudly in the Ellinor Grimmark debate. 
Now this brings us to the recognition of another similarity, namely, the question on defining 
the content of a democracy. The frequency of the notion general sense of justice in the Poland 
affair discloses that indeed, it was a question of democracy, for the law was not to moralise 
without support in the public opinion. One may express that the opinion mobilised in relation 
to the event; religious morals were not to be preached for a woman already in a vulnerable 
position. It was not considered democratic to disregard social conditions. The rather sharp 
contrast between the authorities’ first conclusion and the more popular opinion seem to have 
amplified the gap experienced between the powers and the people. As for conscientious 
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objection to abortion, debaters held it less democratic – rather totalitarian – to not accept a 
dissident like Ellinor Grimmark. At least, this strand opines that the refusals to hire Ellinor 
Grimmark were equal to the non-acceptance of dissidents. The totalitarian argument, a less 
reasonable one, appeared in both debates, and can probably be said to be indicative of the 
individualist approach. 
 
There is no connection between abortion and conscientious objection to abortion, some 
debaters argued. Indeed, abortion as a right created under the right to a private life and 
freedom of expression are two different rights; they are separate. Ellinor Grimmark’s 
objection at work will not affect access to abortion. Consequently, this argument is quite 
persuasive. Against this finding speaks history and our experiences of abortion and doctors’ 
morals under the 1938 Abortion Act. The statistics in Italy is another argument in this 
armoury. However, it is probably an axiom that Sweden and Italy differ severely when it 
comes to the status religion holds. Application of critical positivism here points us in another 
direction. If we accept that law comprises the three levels and that the system operates to 
justify itself, within itself, one may argue that the values of the current abortion law has 
trickled down to the sediments and is considered the right solution of the problem. Regardless 
if a midwife’s conscientious objection to abortion could potentially affect access to abortion, 
the Labour Court’s finding can be considered as indicative of the Swedish context. 
Throughout the procedure, authorities have unanimously come to the same conclusion in the 
balancing task: in the context, the rights and interests of others – women – are heavier on the 
scales. This affirms the individualist approach, where the state shall be neutral. Religion and 
moral is something for the private sphere, and the state shall not moralise in providing the 
individual with different services that help facilitate private life. 
 
Notwithstanding the outcome in the case of Ellinor Grimmark, she argued that her position in 
the abortion question per se affected the contested decisions, and that this was a violation of 
her freedom of expression. Indeed, some managers did not express that they sympathised with 
Ellinor Grimmark’s conscience. However, to conclude that this, taken together with the 
refusals to employ her, is the act of a totalitarian state, is hasty. To not employ her as she 
refused to perform some of her duties are of course not dictatorship; it is not an attempt to 
dictate her mind. Nevertheless, in the Poland case, penal law existed to maintain morals. If 
anything, that was a situation where the state tried to dictate the minds and bodies of its 
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citizens – to be born a woman and become pregnant in a difficult situation is certainly not 
comparable to the act of applying for a job. 
 
Noteworthy, the managerial prerogative appeared in the debate. In regard to this argument, it 
is clear that the outcome was affected by the values in the 1975 Abortion Act. As clinics are 
under a duty to provide abortions, this duty – safeguarding women’s right to abortion – was 
indeed considered more important in the collision of interests.  
 
How are the changes reflected in the patterns of law and societal values – what the interest of 
society is framed as – as to abortion in the relevant period of time? 
 
As we know by now, general prevention and general sense of justice were frequently referred 
to in the Poland case. The Prosecutor General wanted to preserve the morals by pronouncedly 
maintaining the values in the 1938 Abortion Act. A strict separation between law and morals 
had not been realised, as the law built on explicit moral grounds. Noteworthy, the Prosecutor 
General did not let go of the general prevention; he agreed with abolition, noting that through 
the media coverage, people had learnt that such abortions abroad were punishable. Therefore, 
prosecution was no longer called for as to secure this knowledge among the population. 
However paternalistic, the Prosecutor General’s statement is typical for a jurist. An explicit 
aim, despite the existing indications, in the entire abortion regulation was to maintain the 
morality. Dura lex, sed lex summarises the Prosecutor General’s interpretation. Nevertheless, 
political powers meddled with the judicial powers. As Tuori argues, validity is equally 
important in a modern society of legal positivism as it was in one of natural law. May it be 
that the rather confused relationship between the old maxim and the judiciary practice was 
brought up through the Poland case. These practices displayed the ambiguity: abortions were 
not overcome and social reforms had not proven sufficient. But – the morals, and the decency! 
Indeed, the media coverage seem to have raised awareness. Many people felt that the law was 
a class law and protested against the moralising doctors; people felt sympathy for young 
women. Knowing that the social reforms had not been sufficient and that the morals of others 
could strengthen a vulnerable position, people were ready for a change.  
 
When grasping the Poland case and its aftermath with the help of critical positivism, the 
process where the deep structure was brought up to the surface level happened within a 
number of days. Certainly, the conflict was not a new one, yet, the Prosecutor General’s 
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statement provoked something. As the story was covered for days in media all over the 
country, the information reached numerous of citizens. The Poland affair brought the 
conflicting matters to a head and contributed to a sharp turn in the legislation. The abolition 
decision and the amendment of the law had support in the public opinion, but the resistance 
was strong. As seen, the resistance invoked that ‘the true general sense of justice’ advocated 
high sexual morals and the sanctity of life. Indeed, the conservative approach had support in 
the 1938 Abortion Act. Apparently, the law had gradually lost validity. 
 
With this in mind, we move to what interest was promoted by society. The earlier abortion 
laws exercised control in the name of the sanctity of life and morality. As we have seen, this 
interest was questioned already in the early 1900’s. Nevertheless, the questioning stood in the 
spotlight during the Poland case. Through the Prosecutor General statement, the governing 
principles were brought into light. One potential answer here is that the amended abortion law 
had made it possible for many to obtain abortion, oftentimes by paying medical personnel, 
whereby many could actually get abortion. As this was paired with absence of prosecution 
and the provision on special reasons in Chapter 3 Article 11 of the Penal Code, the 
enthusiasm of reform had been asleep– until the Poland case was discussed and pulled the old 
moral into daylight. Why should the nationality principle awaken morals that had, more or 
less, ceased to apply domestically? In the 1975 Abortion Act, the principle that recently had 
been unimaginable to respect, came to form the new principal interest. Now, the preparatory 
works to the 1975 Abortion Act confirmed that doctors had a duty to secure a woman’s right 
to obtain abortion; a woman’s right to decide for herself was strongly underlined. 
Symptomatic, religion and the sanctity of life was scarcely dealt with in the preparatory 
works. Despite the critique from many instances, the issue was considered to have been dealt 
with enough at the time – it belonged to history. Today, Sweden has proclaimed to be an 
ambassador for reproductive health. This is reflected in the Region’s argument, that abortion-
seeking women had to be protected and put first. 
 
Another explanation of the Swedish approach to conscientious objection to abortion can be 
found in the state’s mission to present democratic values to its citizens. As the ECtHR 
concluded, parts of many religions are not compatible with the strife for equality. It remains 
true that a woman’s body is affected by pregnancy. No matter the situation a woman finds 
herself in, the possibility of abortion can adjust some of the biological differences we cannot 
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change, and thereby heal possible struggles of an unwanted pregnancy – an expression of 
equity. 
 
The Swedish state no longer considers itself a responsible entity in the protection of the 
unborn. The personal morale is no longer a state interest in the context. The urge to protect the 
patient can be seen as an expression of the positivist division between law and morals. Indeed, 
the existence of ‘free’ abortion confirms the distinction between Is and Ought – history have 
taught us that a vast number of women will obtain abortions, no matter what the law 
prescribes – one may put it as an expression of traditional human law. Is is this, however sad, 
insight. Ought is the strife to diminish the number of abortions, a strife that society still claims 
to pursue. Is comprises the law, a regulation of the practical outcome to protect – and not 
moralise over – the woman from turning to charlatans, or even death. This is not to say, that, 
for example, harmful practices that have existed throughout the entire history of humanity can 
be justified. One must separate different questions, and indeed, a general ultima ratio 
discussion is not for this thesis. In addition, those with another perception as to when life 
begins can never agree with the current abortion legislation. But it remains that a woman 
gives birth, with all its practical aftermath – no matter the conclusion an objective weighing of 
the colliding interests may arrive at. Hence, the 1975 Abortion Act does only give little – if 
any – room for Ought; Ought used to govern the field. Nevertheless, some may argue that the 
law remains moral, as laws tend to express values either way. However, a law that lets the 
individual choose for herself – to do or not to – must be considered less moralising than a law 
comprised of a favoured behaviour upheld by a penal provision. This is not to say that such 
laws are always uncalled for. 
 
As for changes in relation to freedom of religion, we saw how the Christian values lost 
importance with the introduction of the 1975 Abortion Act. The separation between the state 
and the Church of Sweden in 2000 serves to illustrate what happened clearly. The dominating 
church, with its traditions, was phased out. The public was not to express any religion, and 
religion was not something to exercise whilst representing the state. Religion has grown into a 
private matter. The Labour Court judgment confirms this conclusion. Furthermore, we can 
categorise the 1975 Abortion Act as such a social reform law that religious exercise is not to 
impede, according to the preparatory works. Ergo, religious convictions are not allowed to 
affect access to abortion. JO’s interpretation of conscientious objectors in the 1970’s 
strengthens this finding; the statement by the Minister of Justice was by JO considered 
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restrained. The religious respect within the abortion legislation was not left much room – that 
had already been dealt with during time and again. Furthermore, the statement by the Minister 
of Justice in the preparatory works underlined that respecting conscientious objection to 
abortion should mainly be done to respect the abortion-seeking women. In addition, a clause 
on conscientious objection was deliberately avoided at the time when the new law was 
created. One may argue that this course of action further confirms the diminishing role of 
religion. The morals of doctors had earlier caused trouble. Evidently, the Minister of Justice 
did not want those impediments to continue. It is here interesting to take note of the education 
provision in the ECHR, in 1952. At the time, Sweden made a reservation as exemption from 
teachings in the dominating religion, Christianity, could not be guaranteed. Toward this 
background, the radical changes are even more interesting. Earlier, schools – a public 
institution – were dominated by Christianity. Further back in time, midwives had to swear not 
to perform abortion; medical practitioners were prohibited to ordinate abortifacients. Today, 
hospitals, a public institution, are reluctant to accept that this religious doctrine appears within 
the medical practice. The fact that this is an exercise of authority strengthens the 
interpretation. As we have learned, Swedish authorities are to express democratic values. 
Morals in relation to a decision on abortion is hard to combine with the respect for the 
individual subject to the state’s authority – a woman is left to the state as the state holds the 
mandate in the area. Indeed, the interrogated managers in the case of Ellinor Grimmark are 
ambassadors for the right to abortion, and they too contribute to the reproduction of the 
existing norms. 
 
Like Tuori argues, every court decision has implications for the other layers. The Labour 
Court judgment, one may argue, consolidates the general mistrust against conscientious 
objection. This mistrust is visible in that Sweden remains one of the few, even in difference 
from the other Nordic countries that we usually are similar to, to refuse the introduction of a 
clause on conscientious objection to abortion. Moreover, it cements the interpretation stressed 
by legal scholars on that religion is, in principal, a matter of individual conscience, belonging 
to the private sphere. As a midwife is a part of the state when at work, and the state has 
decided on abortion in accordance with the 1975 Abortion Act, she is simply not to deviate 
from the set standard. We have observed that the construction of discrimination is built on a 
presumption as to the midwife profession, a presumption that comprises the notion that within 
the profession lie the duties to perform and support women in abortion procedures. One may 
argue that the experience of the varying access to abortion in the country in the application of 
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the 1938 Abortion Act, that depended on the doctors’ subjective feelings and opinions on 
abortion controlled the application of the law, can be seen as a rationale behind this. For 
certain, the Labour Court did not invoke the history of access to abortion, but, the court 
operates within a secular legal system and, most importantly, dealt with a case whose 
occurrence is based in the values of the 1975 Abortion Act – a law that builds on inter alia 
this experience. To invoke the managerial prerogative in relation to Ellinor Grimmark must be 
considered reasonable against this background. That the Swedish relationship to religion is 
manifested in a way that requires civil servants to comply with the current legal framework is 
nothing strange in a positivist legal order – it is reasonable to respect the majority principle in 
the context of abortion. But, this is not only an expression of legality, for it is the assertion 
behind the 1975 Abortion Act every midwife has to comply with, in stark contrast to the 
assertion behind the 1938 Abortion Act and its precedents. A century ago, midwives like 
Carolina Redlund, mentioned in the introduction, opposed to the presumptions embedded in 
the earlier laws. Today, midwives find themselves in a framework of an exact opposite to that 
Carolina Redlund found herself in. As for now, all three levels of law seem to constantly 
produce and reproduce the values in favour of the Poland travellers – in disfavour of Ellinor 
Grimmark. Here, we clearly see what Tuori has claimed. The surface level of the law has run 
down to strongly root and set in at the two lower levels. The Labour Court’s findings in the 
case of Ellinor Grimmark make a good example of how the levels are intertwined, reproduce, 
and produce one another. Even though the PACE resolutions promotes conscientious 
objection, their construction – that access to legal abortion must be secured when 
conscientious objection to abortion is introduced – builds on the existence of a right to 
abortion, and in a way, at least in their wording, further affirms the primacy of abortion.  
 
The grips by the Prosecutor General and the Minister of Justice summarise the changes. From 
the tirade on preservation of Swedish morals, general prevention and the illation that a foetus 
in a Swedish woman’s body is a Swedish interest to the finding that abolition had to be 
employed in order to protect the women involved; two downright contradictory findings, all 
over the course of two weeks. People were met with headlines that revealed arbitrariness and 
an ambiguous application of the law during the first months of 1965. Even if Kling asserted 
that he already was about to propose a change in the abortion legislation, it is evident that this 
took off properly during the time of the Poland affair. Thus, abortion went from the form of 
an exception to a penal provision to the shape of a full-scale right. The changes of course 
reflect the advances within the women’s rights movement and the emerging line of thought 
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that advocated the individual in relation to the state. Religious morals were as good as thrown 
away. Under these circumstances and conditions Ellinor Grimmark appears. The existing 
framework justifies itself, and therefore, the idea underpinning the abortion law – no morals 
are to affect a woman’s decision – continues to limit what arguments are acceptable in our 
time. The Labour Court’s finding is an elongation of a history lesson. An individual’s latitude 
of action in the area related to morals and abortion is nowadays narrow; Ellinor Grimmark’s 
case makes this visible. That she even questions the values within the 1975 Abortion Act 
revives the abortion debate in Sweden. Then, what appears before us from this study seems 
clear as the sun in the summer sky. The reason cases like Ellinor Grimmark’s even exist is the 
rise of new interests somewhere in the 1960’s and latter, the incorporation of those values into 
the 1975 Abortion Act. One thing has not changed, namely the goal society has set: to 
diminish the number of abortions is still the ultimate objective. However, the rationale behind 
may have changed – from protecting the foetus to protecting women. 
 
How is the Swedish regulation affected by the ECHR from a perspective of state-specific 
morals? 
 
To guess whether Ellinor Grimmark’s case will be admissible and heard before the ECtHR is 
not for this thesis. However, that she will proceed and file a claim before the ECtHR is 
interesting to discuss. Nor is it for this thesis to augur the ECtHR’s potential application of the 
margin of appreciation doctrine, but, we can conclude that as Sweden already deviates from 
the European standard, a judgment from the ECtHR could potentially have large implications 
for Sweden. However, conscientious objection is examined under the Article 9 § 2, as a 
manifestation. Therefore, we know that under the ECHR there exists no absolute right to 
conscientious objection. Here, the margin of appreciation plays a decisive role. And indeed, 
the answer to the question posed can be found in the doctrine of margin of appreciation. As 
we have seen, ECHR does not contain a general right to abortion, but the 1975 Abortion Act 
creates a right to abortion for women (within Sweden’s jurisdiction). In this sense, the ECHR 
strengthens the right to abortion in Sweden, as it has the status of a right under the ECHR; it 
also contributes by further justifying the existing values in the 1975 Abortion Act. Case law 
implies that it is up for each state to decide on the matter, given that a fair balance is struck by 
the national authorities. Apparently, Sweden’s liberal abortion law and Ireland’s restrictive 
regulation constitute the outcome of a fair balancing. Even though the ECtHR does not cease 
to apply at the workplace, the contractual obligations are often given precedence. Moreover, 
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as we learned from the Labour Court judgment, the construction of discrimination – both 
direct and indirect – draws on presumptions derived from the context. Belike will the margin 
of appreciation allow the narrative of the Swedish context – that abortion is a part of 
midwifery – to prevail. Therefore, the illation that the ECHR serves to strengthen the state-
specific morals in the context is close at hand. What human rights are can be said to vary 
across borders and times, as the state-specific context and values are allowed to shape human 
rights. The knowledge that Sweden had an abortion law of quite a different nature in force 
when signing and ratifying the ECHR, supports this illation; it illustrates the changing nature 
of what interest a state promotes. Indeed, the endeavour of Ireland to preserve morals and the 
general sense of justice as depicted in Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland is not 
too far from our own, Swedish reality. The same endeavour can be identified in the early days 
of the Poland case. Certainly, Europe is under constant development and the times have 
changed since then. Still, it remains true that ECHR had the same content in relation to 
abortion back then, over five decades ago. If nothing else, this teaches us to be humble as we 
gaze across Europe and criticise others. The ECtHR constantly reserves itself against a 
potential development, whereby a once wide margin of appreciation can convert into a 
narrow. This could of course in a near future affect Sweden in any direction. The resolutions – 
that Sweden has chosen not to comply with – inviting states to introduce a clause on the right 
to conscientious objection to abortion are indicative of a European trend, especially so as 
Resolution 1763 began as an initiative to strengthen abortion rights, but ended in being one of 
the right to conscientious objection. As for now, abortion regulations and clauses on 
conscientious objection to abortion in other European countries do not, through the ECHR, 
affect Sweden. 
 
One may argue that the margin of appreciation is a way of avoiding encroachments. However, 
a total unity does not always constitute a guarantee for greater enjoyment of human rights – in 
these matters, we see that the outcome varies depending on the national context. What context 
and doctrine that affects the ECtHR in defining a right can vary as well. From this point of 
view, to allow state-specific morals can be positive, where cases before the ECtHR displays 
the temperature of a question and the diversity allows for development towards standards that 
take into account all human rights even better – the common forum allows for audit. Even 
though the ECHR for now does allow the national context to be decisive in this type of 
questions, it remains that the ECtHR per se affects Sweden significantly through the 
fundamental right for every individual to have his or her claim heard and tried before an 
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international court like the ECtHR. The recognition that conscientious objection falls under 
freedom of religion and abortion can come within the scope of the right to private life, opens 
the human rights door. This is a valuable and influential possibility, as it enables for 
individuals to question and make visible practice and prominent values within a nation. 
Nevertheless, one can always travel abroad to find a legal order that is pleasing and then, 
instigate a change. 
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6 Conclusion and Final Remarks 
This thesis has shown the changes in the values enshrined within the Swedish abortion laws 
during the last decades, all by using two rather particular cases. If the Poland case symbolises 
a powerful turn where the morals were wrested before a youthful people’s court, then the case 
of Ellinor Grimmark represents the aftermath of the reform. Indeed, the case of Ellinor 
Grimmark is a result of the changes post the Poland case. The time-honoured principle of 
abortion as a criminal act was lifted with the 1975 Abortion Act. Ellinor Grimmark’s pursuit 
is one of the inevitable consequences of the volte-face. The otherwise quite eviscerated 
expression ‘paradigm shift’ is to the point and made justice in this judicial milieu, for the 
principal rule suffered defeat and was replaced by its true antagonist. Conscientious objectors 
constitute what can be described as an extremity, the utter result of the values in the 1975 
Abortion Act; Ellinor Grimmark’s claim accentuates and elucidates how decidedly Sweden 
relegated the old norms to history. One possible explanation for the quite harsh treatment of 
Ellinor Grimmark in media – at large, jeers have not been included, for rather obvious reasons 
– can be sought in the history of abortion in Sweden. It could be that the winding road to the 
liberalisation has had retinues – from a small lacuna, via the first indications and the two 
indications added, to an event spread out over all newspapers and at last, awareness. From this 
we can see that what begins as a small adjustment contrary to the values of a law, can end in a 
framework that instead promotes what once was the tiny adjustment. As Tuori explains – now 
the value justifies itself, and gains validity from within its own legal framework. We have 
seen how such a small thing grew to root itself in the majority. We have also seen how a legal 
institute – abolition – was employed to mediate between the levels of the law, and how Kungl. 
Maj:t – the government, a high political organ – interfered. An interference that reveals the 
alterable and political nature of the abortion laws. Holding the status of legislation and not a 
constitutional right, a change could come if the public opinion changes. For now, the question 
remains one of the religious and nationalist parties. Knowing that Sweden has a history when 
health care personnel exerted power over access to abortion, this allows us to see the stance 
among hospital managers in another light. The fewer the morals the stronger the focus on the 
individual patient. It would be tempting to argue that the Labour Court’s judgment was a 
requiem for old morals. However, the existing trend in Europe signifies the opposite. The 
status of abortion in Poland today, knowing that Swedish women used to travel there, might 
contextualise the opposition to conscientious objection to abortion, within both the legal 
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application and the general debate. Indeed, the statistics from Italy, the events in the U.S.A., 
the fact that Women on Waves exists, and the connections between Ellinor Grimmark and 
ADF349 speak for themselves in the search for an understanding of the strong repulsion in 
Sweden against conscientious objection to abortion. Thus we see, the state can be neutral with 
regard to the application of the law, but the law is filled with values and builds upon them. In 
this field, the ECHR holds no categorical directives and provides no answer, it only serves to 
vindicate the Swedish solution and therefore constitutes yet another phenomenon of law 
within the system that confirms the system.  
 
To round off, a reflection by Peter Englund – a Swedish author and historian – is suitable. The 
quote comes from a foreword to the collection of essays “Förflutenhetens landskap”. 
Studying a painting by Phillips de Koninck at the National Gallery in London, he reflects: 
 
I fjärran en stad, krönt av kyrkspirornas fint mejslade siluetter. Därefter börjar havet 
som en strimma av silver och bortom det, kan vi tänka oss, en ny värld.350 
 
Standing in the moment of a now, Peter Englund beautifully pondered the past shown to him 
in a landscape painting. His reflection helps illuminate the very core of the changes that have 
been examined in this thesis. Perhaps the refusal to grant conscientious objection to abortion 
becomes clearer with history in mind. It might be that Ellinor Grimmark, her peers, and the 
European tendencies of today mark the end of an era in the sphere of abortion. The values 
enshrined in the amended 1975 Abortion Act are put under the microscope – like the values of 
the Penal Code and the 1938 Abortion Act once were. Ellinor Grimmark questions the pre-
conditions of the contemporary law. The presumptions in the deep structure level are made 
visible, namely, a woman’s right to decide over her own body, work-related ethics and the 
perception of religion as something private; these presumptions limit what rationales and 
arguments that are accepted at the surface level. The values constantly reproduce themselves, 
just recently in the Labour Court judgment. As for now, their protection is heightened under 
the ECHR. The ECHR also serves to justify and strengthen the status of abortion in Swedish 
                                                
349 See ADF International, Grimmark v. Jönköping County Council. Available at: 
https://adfinternational.org/detailspages/case-details/grimmark-v.-jönköping-county-council, where ADF 
confirms partnership with Scandinavian Human Rigths lawyers, (accessed 19th May 2017). 
350 In translation: In the far distance a town, by the skyline of delicate church spires crowned. Thereafter like a 
ray of silver the sea begins, and beyond this we can imagine a new world. Englund, Peter, Förflutenhetens 
landskap. Historiska essäer, Stockholm: Atlantis, 1991, p. 8. Title in translation: The Landscape of the Past. 
Historical essays. 
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opinion: abortion is an individual choice. It seems as if the ECHR confirms, in a Swedish 
context, that religion belongs to the private sphere. To stand at this contrasting point 
facilitates the observance of the changes around the time of the Poland case; the contrasts are 
amplified by the comparison. Swedish interests have varied considerably during the last 
decades – from promoting true evangelism to mediating democratic values. From protecting a 
Swedish foetus to guaranteeing women’s autonomy. Knowing the background of the abortion 
law, Ellinor Grimmark’s claim seems almost atavistic, whilst the women who travelled to 
Poland almost were guilty of an anachronism. Wherever one may stand in the question on 
abortion and conscientious objection, all the individuals in the events discussed unite in that 
their actions and claims were in opposition to the values within the laws. Their actions 
illuminate the traditional base in the human rights strife: to protect the individual from a state 
that imposes unjustified laws over her mind and body. 
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